University of North Carolina School of Law

Carolina Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

Summer 2010

Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Representation
Barbara A. Fedders
University of North Carolina School of Law, fedders@email.unc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons

Publication: Lewis & Clark Law Review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Carolina
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

Do Not Delete

4/7/2010 5:44 PM

LOSING HOLD OF THE GUIDING HAND: INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
REPRESENTATION
by
Barbara Fedders∗
Lawyers for children in juvenile delinquency proceedings frequently
provide their clients deficient representation. In addition to failing to
investigate the facts of a case and research the applicable law, they ignore
relevant ethical mandates and fail to address the demands created by the
unique characteristics of children. The widespread nature of
substandard legal representation, combined with delinquent
adjudications’ serious and long-term consequences, makes it imperative
that juveniles harmed by deficient legal representation have access to
some form of legal redress. Yet, at present, no such remedy exists. A child
who is adjudicated delinquent can theoretically bring a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), which, if granted, results in a
new adjudicatory or dispositional hearing or a plea withdrawal. In
practice, however, systemic and doctrinal barriers prevent children from
filing IAC claims and from receiving appellate review of those claims. As
a recent survey of IAC claims in delinquency cases suggests, children file
these claims in an extremely small number of cases. Moreover, courts
almost never grant relief on the basis of these claims. This form of
appellate review fails to provide meaningful remedies to the large number
of children harmed by substandard legal representation. Although
commentators have explored this problem in the context of adult criminal
defendants, this Article is among the first to examine the inadequacy of
the IAC remedy for juveniles. It traces the history of the grant of the right
to counsel to juveniles; analyzes substandard representation’s nature,
causes, and extent; details systemic and doctrinal barriers facing
juveniles who wish to file IAC claims; and offers preliminary proposals
for reform.
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“[The juvenile] requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
**
proceedings against him.”
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article explores the widespread occurrence of deficient legal
representation in juvenile court and the absence of any meaningful
remedy to this problem. In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court issued In re
Gault, holding that the assistance of counsel was “essential” in juvenile
1
delinquency cases that could end in confinement for a child. Appalled at
the frequent disregard of rudimentary due process standards by juvenile
court judges, the Gault Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment
required that children and youth charged with criminal offenses in

**
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (Fortas, J.) (1967) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
1
Id. at 36–37.
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juvenile court were entitled to a number of legal protections. Among
3
these, the right to counsel was most notable. Some forty years later, the
routinely substandard quality of the legal representation provided by
4
lawyers in juvenile court has undermined the significance of the right.
Children and youth who are adjudicated delinquent—juvenile court
terminology for being criminally convicted—confront a number of
5
serious short- and long-term negative consequences. They may, for
6
instance, be confined in state facilities for many years. Beyond the life of
2
Id. at 41–42, 56 (holding that juveniles have right to notice of charges, to
counsel, to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and to privilege against
self-incrimination).
3
See, e.g., Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57
BUFF. L. REV. 1447, 1458 n.36 (2009) (citing articles praising Gault’s holding that
children facing criminal charges have a right to counsel).
4
See PATRICIA PURITZ ET AL., ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS (1995) (documenting deficient representation in juvenile courts
around the country); ABA PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS
OF CHILDREN & THEIR FAMILIES, AMERICA’S CHILDREN AT RISK: A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR
LEGAL ACTION (1993) (noting lack of competent representation in juvenile courts
throughout the country); Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re Gault at 40: The Right to Counsel in
Juvenile Court—A Promise Unfulfilled, 44 CRIM. L. BULL. 371, 381–82, 39 (2008)
(discussing findings of sixteen state-wide assessments of juvenile courts conducted by
National Juvenile Defender Center and noting that their findings indicate that “at the
time they were done, competent lawyering was the exception rather than the norm in
juvenile court of those states”); Susanne M. Bookser, Note, Making Gault Meaningful:
Access to Counsel and Quality of Representation in Delinquency Proceedings for Indigent Youth,
3 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 297 (2004) (noting juvenile courts’ common
characteristics detailed in state reports regarding the quality of counsel).
5
Where this Article uses the term “juvenile,” it refers to those children and
youth under the jurisdiction of their state’s juvenile delinquency court. Most states
end juvenile court jurisdiction at age eighteen or seventeen. Tamar R. Birckhead,
North Carolina, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, and the Resistance to Reform, 86 N.C. L. REV.
1443, 1445 nn.1 & 3 (2008). Many states refer to courts that handle juvenile cases as
“family courts.” See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 113 (McKinney 2008) (“The family court
of the state of New York is established in each county of the state as part of the
unified court system for the state.”). This Article will describe these courts as “juvenile
courts,” the term by which they are more commonly known. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 218, § 57 (West 2005) (establishing territorial divisions in the juvenile court
system); and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1501 (2009) (defining “juvenile court”). All states
provide for circumstances in which minors can be tried as adults and deficient
representation problems permeate that context. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA
SICKMUND, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006
NATIONAL REPORT 110 (2006); John Johnson Kerbs, (Un)equal Justice: Juvenile Court
Abolition and African Americans, 564 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 109 (1999).
However, the reasons for and implications of those problems are distinguishable
from the problems detailed here, and are therefore beyond the scope of this Article.
6
See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, A Century of Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a
Revolution that Failed?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 189, 253–54 (2007) (noting that beginning in
the late 1980s, juvenile courts developed a more punitive nature). Many states have
changed their juvenile codes to place a stronger emphasis on punishment. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-102(1) (2009) (to protect the public, the juvenile system “will
appropriately sanction juveniles who violate the law”).
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the case, they face so-called “collateral” consequences that can hinder
7
their chances at productive and law-abiding lives. The pervasiveness of
substandard legal representation, combined with the high stakes of
delinquent adjudications, makes it imperative that juveniles harmed by
this representation have access to some form of legal redress. Yet, at
8
present, no such remedy exists.
In theory, a child who is adjudicated delinquent and given a
disposition pursuant to deficient representation can bring an appellate
claim based on an argument that her trial counsel provided ineffective
9
assistance of counsel (IAC). If an appellate court ruled favorably on such
a claim, the relief granted would be a new adjudicatory or dispositional
10
hearing; it could also allow a child to withdraw her plea of delinquency.
However, systemic and doctrinal barriers work to prevent children from
11
filing IAC claims and from having such claims fairly considered. As a
recently conducted survey of IAC claims in delinquency cases indicates,
these claims are filed in an extremely small number of cases and are
almost never granted. It does not appear that they provide meaningful
relief to the large number of children harmed by substandard legal
12
representation.

7
Collateral consequences are not part of the disposition imposed by a court but
consequences that flow from the fact of an adjudication. See Michael Pinard, The
Logistical and Ethical Difficulties of Informing Juveniles About the Collateral Consequences of
Adjudications, 6 NEV. L.J. 1111, 1114–15 (2006) [hereinafter Pinard, Difficulties]
(describing how delinquent adjudications negatively affect children’s future
education, housing and employment opportunities, and may serve as a basis for
enhanced sentences if juveniles are convicted of crimes as adults); Michael Pinard, An
Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry
Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 634–35 (2006)
[hereinafter Pinard, Integrated Perspective].
8
Feld, supra note 6, at 220 (noting dearth of juvenile appeals and describing
juvenile justice process as “nearly incapable of correcting its own errors”).
9
Courts have long held that the entitlement to the assistance of legal counsel is
the entitlement to effective assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,
771 n.14 (1970); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). See Ellen Marrus, Effective
Assistance of Counsel in the Wonderland of “Kiddie Court”—Why the Queen of Hearts Trumps
Strickland, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 393, 393 n.4 (2003) (summarizing reported cases where
appellate courts heard juvenile IAC claims).
10
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (outlining two-prong test
that defendant must meet in establish ineffective assistance such that conviction or
death sentence will be reversed); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (holding
that Strickland v. Washington test applies to withdrawal of guilty pleas based on
ineffective assistance of counsel).
11
N. Lee Cooper et al., Fulfilling the Promise of In re Gault: Advancing the Role of
Lawyers for Children, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 651, 674–75 (1998) (noting that practice
of taking appeals of juvenile delinquency cases is lacking in most jurisdictions);
Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrongful
Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257, 294–99 (2007) (no “active and zealous” appellate
or post-conviction practice in juvenile court); Marrus, supra note 9, at 417–19
(describing hurdles to prevailing on IAC claim presented by legal standard).
12
See discussion infra Part IV.C (detailing survey results and methodology).
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The problem of widespread deficient legal representation plagues
13
adult criminal courts as well. Adults convicted of crimes pursuant to
such representation face similar obstacles to those faced by juveniles in
obtaining relief through IAC claims. Legal scholars have extensively
14
explored the obstacles facing adults. They have proposed such reforms
as creating a more stringent legal standard for assessing the adequacy of
15
trial attorney performance, extending the right to counsel to collateral
16
review proceedings, and allowing appellate attorneys on direct appeal to
supplement the trial court record to bring and adequately support claims
17
of ineffectiveness on direct appeal. By contrast, the unique problems
facing juveniles harmed by substandard representation have gone almost
18
entirely unexamined.
This Article strives to address this vacuum. It explores the nature and
pervasiveness of substandard legal representation, considers the causes of
such representation, and examines the inadequacy of the IAC claim as a
remedy for the resulting harm. Finally, it offers preliminary proposals
toward reform that would allow juveniles both to file IAC claims and to
have them fairly considered by reviewing courts.
19
Part II offers a critical appraisal of Gault. While Gault granted legal
protections designed to eliminate the procedural arbitrariness that
characterized the pre-Gault juvenile court, the right to counsel as framed
by the opinion is in many respects inadequate to the task of ensuring due
process. For example, the right to counsel for children in delinquency
20
proceedings is more limited in scope than the comparable adult right.
13

See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st
Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81 (1995); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997).
14
See, e.g., Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a ChecklistBased Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413
(1988); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to
Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV.
425, 439 (1996); Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1467 (1999); Robert R. Rigg, The Constitution,
Compensation, and Competence: A Case Study, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1999).
15
Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of “Counsel” in the Sixth Amendment,
78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 503 (1993) (arguing for a redefinition of “counsel” to include
only skilled practitioners in criminal cases rather than any licensed attorneys).
16
Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Litigation of Ineffective Assistance Claims: Some
Uncomfortable Reflections on Massaro v. United States, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 793, 801–02
(2004).
17
Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 682 (2007).
18
A Westlaw search uncovered only two articles that addressed IAC claims in
delinquency cases in any length: Marrus, supra note 9, and Drizin & Luloff, supra note
11.
19
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
20
See Marsha Levick & Neha Desai, Still Waiting: The Elusive Quest to Ensure
Juveniles a Constitutional Right to Counsel at All Stages of the Juvenile Court Process, 60
RUTGERS L. REV. 175, 184–90 (2007) (describing the scope of adult and juvenile rights
to counsel).
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Additionally, the Court failed to consider whether and how juveniles’
cognitive and psychosocial underdevelopment would affect their ability
21
to exercise their newly granted rights. Similarly, the Court did not
address whether attorneys in juvenile court would have any special ethical
responsibilities given that their clients tend to be, relative to adult
defendants, cognitively underdeveloped and immature. Part II argues
that Gault did not thus establish the parameters of effective assistance of
counsel. Further, by declining to address whether juveniles have a right
to the transcript of the proceedings or a right to appeal, Gault also failed
to ensure that children aggrieved by IAC would have an appellate
22
remedy.
Part III examines the nature and pervasiveness of substandard legal
representation in juvenile court. Drawing primarily on recent assessments
of juvenile defense systems conducted by the National Juvenile Defender
Center, an organization that provides training and technical assistance to
23
attorneys for youths in delinquency proceedings, Part III presents an
overview of the deficient lawyering that occurs regularly in juvenile courts
across the country. This Part also explains how substandard
representation can lead to significant and lifelong negative consequences
for children and adolescents harmed by it. Finally, Part III suggests
reasons that substandard representation appears endemic in juvenile
court. These reasons include many factors that contribute to substandard
representation in adult criminal court, which are discussed here briefly,
but Part III focuses on those factors that are unique to juvenile practice.
Part IV considers the viability of the IAC remedy for juveniles
harmed by substandard representation. It explains the legal doctrine
governing a reviewing court’s consideration of IAC claims and the
mechanics of filing them. It outlines the types of arguments a juvenile
might make to support her claim of ineffective assistance—some of which
are similar to those an adult might file, and some of which are agespecific and thus unique to juveniles. It surveys the extremely low
number of IAC claims filed over a ten-year period, which provides
support for this Part’s suggestion that IAC claims do not constitute a
meaningful form of relief. Part IV argues that the legal doctrine and rules
governing IAC claims create nearly insurmountable hurdles for juveniles.
While these obstacles are similar to those that face adult criminal
defendants seeking to file IAC claims, Part IV explores how the rules and
case law governing juvenile appeals make accessing the appellate system
21
Donna M. Bishop & Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal Significance of Adolescent
Developmental Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In Re Gault, 60 RUTGERS L. REV.
125, 135–36 (2007) (“In essence, Gault placed the expectation on children to access
and exercise due process rights in the same way adult criminal defendants are
expected to. The Court erred in failing to recognize that procedures that succeed in
securing fairness for adults may not be sufficient to secure fairness for children.”).
22
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 58.
23
National Juvenile Defender Center, About Us, http://www.njdc.info/about
_us.php.
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via an IAC claim particularly difficult for juveniles. Part IV offers
preliminary proposals for reform that would enhance a juvenile’s ability
to file an IAC claim and to have it fairly considered.
The Article concludes by noting that in addition to providing relief
to juveniles on an individual basis, IAC claims can also have some impact,
albeit limited, on the system-wide problem of deficient representation in
juvenile court. It therefore urges that child advocates include among
their advocacy demands and goals a call for reform of the system of filing
IAC claims.
II. THE PROMISE AND UNREALIZED POTENTIAL OF GAULT
Before considering substandard legal representation in juvenile
court, and the inadequacy of the IAC remedy to address the harm that
results from it, it is first necessary to understand how children and
adolescents in that court came to be entitled to legal representation. This
Part briefly traces the development of the modern juvenile court,
focusing on the procedural arbitrariness generated by its emphasis on
flexibility and informality as well as on its hostility to lawyers.
Responding to widespread criticism of that arbitrariness, Gault
provided juveniles with due process protections, including the right to
24
counsel. The extension of the right to counsel to children was
unprecedented and dramatic. Yet the opinion did little to ensure that the
legal counsel rendered would in fact be effective, or that children would
have an appellate remedy if it were not.
A. Before Gault: “To Protect Children from the Law, Not to Bring More Law to
25
Bear on Them”
Just over a hundred years ago, child advocates successfully lobbied
26
for the creation of the nation’s first juvenile courts. Troubled that
children tried and jailed with adults were denied the opportunity for
24

387 U.S. at 13, 41–42, 56.
JOHN R. SUTTON, STUBBORN CHILDREN: CONTROLLING DELINQUENCY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1640–1981, at 160–61 (1988) (“The reformers’ aim was to protect
children from the law, not to bring more law to bear on them. They had little
inclination to specify what the court should look like as a legal institution. Thus they
emphasized the personal and professional qualities of court personnel and largely
ignored the formal properties of court decision making.”).
26
In 1899, Illinois passed the first Juvenile Court Act. 1899 Ill. Laws 131 (current
version at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-2 (West 2009)). Within twenty years, all but
three states had passed similar legislation. ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS:
AMERICA’S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT 81 (1978). Today, every state has a juvenile
court. David B. Mitchell & Sara E. Kropf, Youth Violence: Response of the Judiciary, in
SECURING OUR CHILDREN’S FUTURE: NEW APPROACHES TO JUVENILE JUSTICE AND YOUTH
VIOLENCE 118, 122 (Gary S. Katzmann ed., 2002). See generally TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY, PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 2–4 (1967), reprinted in ELLEN
MARRUS & IRENE MERKER ROSENBERG, CHILDREN AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 3–6 (2007).
25
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rehabilitation, exposed to criminal role models, and abused by convicted
adults with whom they were housed, these advocates envisioned a
27
separate, and different, system for juveniles.
Rather than being adversarial and governed by rules of criminal
procedure, juvenile court proceedings would be informal and flexible,
28
with all parties focused primarily on the child’s rehabilitation. The
vocabulary of the juvenile court reflected the desire to create a system
distinct from the criminal one. Instead of “complaints” or “indictments,”
29
charging documents were petitions “in the welfare of the child.” Rather
30
than being found “guilty,” youths would be found “delinquent.” Instead
31
of “sentences,” youths received “dispositions.” The juvenile court was to
32
act as would a “kind and just parent.” Conspicuous by their omission
were defense lawyers for juveniles who, according to many in the juvenile
court movement, would only make the proceedings unnecessarily narrow
33
and contentious.
The state assumed it had parens patriae power to proceed solely
34
according to its view of the child’s best interest. Rudimentary due
process concerns—such as whether reliable evidence existed to prove
35
that a child had committed an alleged crime, whether the child had

27

In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14–18 (summarizing scholarly literature describing
juvenile court’s origins); see also DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING
3–22 (2004) (describing efforts of reformers and philanthropists during latter part of
the nineteenth century to set up separate justice system in Chicago for children
accused of committing crimes). Some commentators dispute an account of the
juvenile court’s founders that ascribes to them only beneficent motivations. See, e.g.,
BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 56
(1999) (arguing that pro-juvenile court activists and legislators viewed the court as a
social control mechanism for immigrant children flooding the nation’s urban centers
at the turn of the century); Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical
Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1194 (1970) (juvenile court created out of
frustration of law-enforcement professionals that criminal courts routinely failed to
obtain convictions of children owing to jury sympathy).
28
FELD, supra note 27, at 68.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
WILLIAM AYERS, A KIND AND JUST PARENT: THE CHILDREN OF JUVENILE COURT 24
(1997).
33
See generally id. at 26 (discussing Chicago reformer and juvenile court
champion Jane Addams’ negative views about lawyers); Jacob L. Isaacs, The Role of the
Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New Family Court, 12 BUFF. L. REV. 501, 503 (1963).
34
Parens patriae is the state’s power, derived from chancery practice, to act in loco
parentis to protect the property interests and person of the child. In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 16 (1967).
35
See In re Bentley, 16 N.W.2d 390, 393–94 (Wis. 1944) (holding that a petition
alleging the child was delinquent in the language of the statute, if signed by a
probation officer “familiar with the facts,” did not have to include a brief statement of
facts supporting this assertion); State ex rel. Raddue v. Superior Court, 180 P. 875, 876
(Wash. 1919) (holding that a petition alleging that a child “associates with a group of
disorderly boys and engages in conduct which endangers his moral welfare” was
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36

notice of the charges and an opportunity to contest them, and whether
37
the child was compelled to incriminate himself —were subordinated to
38
this power. The doctrinal justification for the state’s ability to do as it
pleased with the juvenile was that the juvenile had no liberty interest that
39
the state was bound to respect. Instead, the juvenile had only a right to
custody, which could be provided by a parent or by the state without legal
40
consequence. Thus, children’s rights as we understand them today were
not ignored or violated by pre-Gault juvenile court personnel; they were
simply not recognized.
Beginning in the late 1950s, support for the juvenile court began to
wane. Empirical evaluations revealed that children “treated” in the
41
juvenile court did not appear to be deterred from future offending.
Civil rights activists objected to the uneven application of juvenile court
42
laws based on race and income. In a series of cases issued beginning in
1945, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of procedure in
43
criminal justice and administrative proceedings. Scholars began to
document and critique abuses that resulted from juvenile court judges’
44
unbridled discretion. Several influential government reports issued in
sufficient for a claim of disorderly conduct at a school, citing privacy concerns of the
child as a reason to leave out more specific facts).
36
See In re Bentley, 16 N.W.2d at 395 (holding that the court was not limited to the
charge in the original petition but was permitted to make additional determinations
in the best interest of the child).
37
See In re Santillanes, 138 P.2d 503, 508 (N.M. 1943) (classifying juvenile
proceedings as “special statutory proceedings” rather than criminal proceedings as
justification for the lack of protection against self-incrimination); People v. Lewis, 183
N.E. 353, 354–55 (N.Y. 1932) (holding that a juvenile delinquency hearing is not a
criminal case, and therefore procedural safeguards against compelled selfincrimination are neither necessary nor a right guaranteed by the constitution or
state law).
38
Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909) (“Why is it
not the duty of the state, instead of asking merely whether a boy or a girl has
committed a specific offense, to find out what he is, physically, mentally, morally, and
then if he learns that he is treading the path that leads to criminality, to take him in
charge, not so much to punish as to reform, not to degrade but to uplift, not to crush
but to develop, not to make him a criminal but a worthy citizen[?]”).
39
Sara Sun Beale, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Two Waves of Juvenile Justice
Reforms as Seen from Jena, Louisiana, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511, 516 n.31 (2009)
(citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967)).
40
See id.
41
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 21–22; FELD, supra note 27, at 80.
42
FELD, supra note 27, at 80.
43
See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 20–21 (“The history of American freedom is, in
no small measure, the history of procedure.” (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S.
401, 414 (1945))); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966) (holding that due
process hearing must precede transfer of juvenile to adult court and noting that
“admonition to function in a ‘parental’ relationship is not an invitation to procedural
arbitrariness”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–40 (1963).
44
Chester James Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L.Q.
387 (1961) (expressing concern that traditional constitutional rights are denied to a
large number of children in juvenile court proceedings without persuasive reasons as
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the 1960s called into question whether the benevolence and paternalism
45
of juvenile court were more theoretical than real. Against this backdrop
of skepticism, state legislatures around the country amended their
juvenile codes to add elements of due process to delinquency
46
proceedings.
B. Announcing an End to a Kangaroo Court
In 1967, amidst widespread condemnation of the juvenile court’s
procedural arbitrariness and abuses, the Supreme Court in Gault held
that children and youth in delinquency proceedings possess
47
constitutional rights. The facts of the case presented an egregious
example of the troubling verdicts and the harsh and disproportionate
dispositions common in juvenile court, as well as the casual handling of
evidence and procedure that facilitated such outcomes. As a result of
making a single obscene telephone call, fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault was
taken from his home by a probation officer, who failed to tell his parents
48
where he had been taken or why. Gerald was brought before a juvenile
court judge without first receiving notice of the charges against him,
adjudicated delinquent, and sentenced without any attorney or
49
adversarial, fact-finding hearing. The probation officer was permitted to
offer hearsay evidence from the complaining witness. There were no
other witnesses and no other evidence. The judge remanded Gerald to a
state industrial school—the juvenile system’s prison equivalent—for a
term of up to six years. The penalty that would have applied to an adult
charged with the same offense was a fine of up to fifty dollars, or
50
imprisonment for not more than two months.
Asserting that “the condition of being a boy does not justify a
kangaroo court,” Gault held that constitutional protections were
to the necessity of such a denial); Sheldon Glueck, Some “Unfinished Business” in the
Management of Juvenile Delinquency, 15 SYRACUSE L. REV. 628 (1964) (exploring
problems of absence of procedural protections in juvenile court); Monrad G.
Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547, 550 (1957) (stating that
humanitarian goals of original juvenile court are no justification for denying young
people constitutional rights, notwithstanding absence of “criminal” label).
45
See, e.g., NATIONAL CRIME COMMISSION REPORT, H.R. DOC. NO. 90-53 (1967),
available at http://bulk.resource.org/gao.gov/90-618/0000551A.pdf; PRESIDENT’S
COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
FREE SOCIETY (1967) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S COMM’N], available at http://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf.
46
As of 1967, at least one-third of the states provided, via either statute or court
rule, the right of representation by retained counsel in juvenile delinquency
proceedings, notice of the right, assignment of counsel, or a combination of these. In
re Gault, 387 U.S. at 37 n.63.
47
Id. at 13 (“[W]hatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”).
48
Id. at 4–5.
49
Id. at 7–8.
50
Id. at 8–9.
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necessary to prevent the arbitrariness that had resulted in the six-year
51
sentence for Gerald. Specifically, juveniles would henceforth be entitled
to written and timely notice of the charges against them, the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses against them, the privilege against
self-incrimination, and the right to counsel at an adjudicatory hearing
52
that could result in confinement. In its holding, the majority rejected
the notion that the juvenile court’s rehabilitative aspirations depended
53
on denying children constitutional protections. It held that none of the
unique and benevolent features of the juvenile court (emphasis on
rehabilitation, flexibility, and confidentiality) would be impaired by the
extension of due process to juveniles. The Court instead viewed due
process guarantees as consistent with, and important for the achievement
of, the goal of rehabilitation. In support, it cited a sociological study that
had concluded: “Unless appropriate due process of law is followed, even
the juvenile who has violated the law may not feel that he is being fairly
treated and may therefore resist the rehabilitative efforts of court
54
personnel.” The holding that a child in a delinquency proceeding has a
liberty interest that demands protection, not merely a custody interest,
55
constituted a significant doctrinal shift. So too did the statement that
that liberty interest could not reliably be protected by a probation officer
56
or judge.
The majority emphasized the necessity of counsel to ensuring the
57
realization of due process for youths in juvenile court. Without counsel,
the Court noted, a juvenile could not be expected to perform the
necessary fact investigation, legal research, evidentiary objections, or

51

Id. at 28.
Id. at 33–55.
Id. at 25–31.
54
Id. at 26 (quoting STANTON WHEELER & LEONARD S. COTTREL, JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY: ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL 33 (1966)).
55
See id. at 17. Seventeen years later, a different Court appeared to reconsider
the robustness of the liberty interest it was willing to grant to juveniles. Upholding a
vague preventive detention scheme for juveniles, the majority in Schall v. Martin
declared that while a “juvenile’s . . . interest in freedom from institutional
restraints . . . is undoubtedly substantial . . . that interest must be qualified by the
recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody.” 467
U.S. 253, 265 (1984). The dissent found the characterization of preventive detention
as nothing more than a transfer of custody from a parent or guardian to the State
“difficult to take seriously.” Id. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 35–36 (“Probation officers . . . are also arresting officers.
They initiate proceedings and file petitions . . . and they testify, as here, against the
child. . . . The probation officer cannot act as counsel for the child. His role in the
adjudicatory hearing, by statute and in fact, is as arresting officer and witness against
the child. Nor can the judge represent the child.”).
57
Id. at 41. The majority quoted approvingly from the Report of the President’s
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice: “[N]o . . . action
holds more potential for achieving procedural justice for the child in the juvenile
court than provision of counsel.” Id. at 38 n.65 (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMM’N, supra
note 45, at 86).
52
53
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58

presentation of a defense. Such tasks were essential because
delinquency proceedings that could end in a juvenile’s confinement in a
state facility were, the Court ruled, comparable in seriousness to a felony
59
prosecution. Accordingly, the Court cited as precedent those cases that
60
had extended the right to counsel to adults. Furthermore, the Court
stated that the assistance of counsel was to be effective assistance of
61
counsel.
C. Gault’s Limitations
While the extension of a right to counsel to youths in delinquency
proceedings was doctrinally dramatic, the right granted was actually less
powerful than it could have been. The narrow scope of the right to
counsel, the Court’s treatment of a child’s right to waive counsel, and the
ambiguity in the Court’s explanation of a parent’s role in delinquency
proceedings have all contributed to a diminution of the power of the
grant of a counsel right. Additionally, in failing to consider how
immaturity and cognitive underdevelopment would affect youths’ ability
to exercise their newly granted due-process rights, the Court missed a
crucial opportunity to define the parameters of effective assistance of
counsel. Further, by declining to address whether juveniles have a right
to a transcript of the proceedings or a right to appeal, Gault also failed to
62
ensure that children aggrieved by IAC would have an appellate remedy.

58

Id. at 36–40.
Id. at 36, 49. “[C]ommitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration
against one’s will, whether it is called ‘criminal’ or ‘civil.’” Id. at 50. The majority also
noted that many juvenile courts typically disregarded even those due process
protections that would typically be available even in civil proceedings, such as notice.
Id. at 17 n.22.
60
Id. at 36 n.57 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932) (extending
right to counsel to capital defendants in state trial under Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (extending
right to counsel to adult defendants under the Sixth Amendment and incorporating
the Sixth Amendment against the states)).
61
The majority’s discussion of effective assistance was contained in its reference
to Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), concluding “In Kent . . . we stated
that . . . . [w]ith respect to the waiver by the Juvenile Court to the adult court of
jurisdiction over an offense committed by a youth . . . ‘there is no place in our system
of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony—
without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of
reasons.’ We announced with respect to such waiver proceedings that while ‘We do
not mean . . . to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the
requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we
do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment.’ We reiterate this view, here in connection with a juvenile court
adjudication of ‘delinquency’ . . . .” In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30 (citations omitted)
(quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 554, 562).
62
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 58.
59
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1. Narrow Scope
In spite of holding that “the child ‘requires the guiding hand of
63
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him,’” the Court did
not extend the right to counsel to all phases of a delinquency
proceeding. The majority declined to address those phases of
delinquency proceedings—detention hearing (analogous to a criminal
bail hearing), arraignment, dispositional hearing (analogous to a
64
criminal sentencing hearing), and post-dispositional hearing —that were
65
not at issue in the factual context of Gault. These omissions are
significant. As commentators have argued, important rights are at stake
in these phases of a delinquency proceeding. Without counsel who can
argue for their release, for example, juveniles face unnecessary detention
while waiting for trial, as well as prolonged and excessive periods of
66
confinement following adjudication. Additionally, without an attorney
to represent them after they have been committed to a state facility,
juveniles essentially have no ability to argue that they are being denied
necessary or court-ordered services. Today, while some states provide
counsel for juveniles in the other phases of delinquency proceedings,
67
many do not. This has meant that many youths are subject to some of
the same unfair treatment that characterized juvenile courts pre-Gault.

63

Id. at 36 (citing Powell, 287 U.S. at 69).
See HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 104 (2006) (explaining the
stages of a delinquency proceeding).
65
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13. “We do not in this opinion consider the impact of
these constitutional provisions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile
and the state. We do not even consider the entire process relating to juvenile
‘delinquents.’ For example, we are not here concerned with the procedures or
constitutional rights applicable to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor
do we direct our attention to the post-adjudicative or dispositional process. We
consider only the problems presented to us by this case. These relate to the
proceedings by which a determination is made as to whether a juvenile is a
‘delinquent’ as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that
he may be committed to a state institution.” Id. (citations omitted).
66
See, e.g., Levick & Desai, supra note 20, at 175 (stating that the “failure of states
to . . . provide counsel at certain critical stages of delinquency proceedings, leaves
many youth vulnerable”); Sandra Simkins, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: How the Lack of
Postdispositional Advocacy in Juvenile Court Increases the Risk of Recidivism and Institutional
Abuse, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 207, 210 (2007) (arguing that, because a child’s
rehabilitation occurs, if it occurs at all, entirely through post-adjudication programs
ordered by a court, legal advocacy is essential in the post-adjudication phase to
ensure that these programs are provided and function as intended). Although the
problems of substandard juvenile court legal representation are similar to the
problems created by the absence of an attorney at all stages of a delinquency
proceeding, it is beyond the scope of this Article to consider fully and separately the
impact of not providing attorneys to juveniles at all stages.
67
See Tory J. Caeti et al., Juvenile Right to Counsel: A National Comparison of State
Legal Codes, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 611, 628 & n.115 (1996) (listing nineteen states that
provide counsel at all stages of delinquency proceedings); Kristin Henning, Loyalty,
Paternalism, and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and the Role of Child’s Counsel in
64
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The scope of the right to counsel for adult criminal defendants is
broader. The Supreme Court has held that adults charged with crimes
with a potential penalty of incarceration must be appointed counsel at all
68
stages of the prosecution in which substantial rights may be affected.
69
70
These so-called “critical” stages include pretrial lineups, arraignments,
71
72
probable cause hearings, and sentencing hearings.
Even though the majority held earlier in the opinion that
delinquency proceedings that could result in significant deprivations of
73
liberty are comparable to felony prosecutions, it justified the narrower
scope of the juvenile right to counsel by stating that because a
delinquency proceeding is different from a criminal prosecution, it need
74
not conform to all the requirements of a criminal trial. The Court
anchored the right to counsel not to the Sixth Amendment, reserved for
criminal prosecutions, but to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
75
Amendment. Other than the privilege against self-incrimination, which
was based on the Fifth Amendment, all the rights extended to juveniles
76
by Gault were grounded in the Due Process Clause. After Gault, the

Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 252 & n.31 (2005) (listing twenty-eight
states that provide for counsel at dispositional stage).
68
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972)); Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37.
69
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) (“[O]ur cases have construed
the Sixth Amendment guarantee to apply to ‘critical’ stages of the proceedings.”).
70
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961).
71
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1970).
72
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
73
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
74
Id. at 30–31 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966)). For an
argument that a critical-stage analysis be applied to delinquency proceedings, see
Levick & Desai, supra note 20, at 184–90.
75
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41 (“We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine
delinquency which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile’s
freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents must be notified of the child’s right to
be represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel,
that counsel will be appointed to represent the child.”). In his concurrence, Justice
Black rejected the view that the rights in question should be afforded under the Due
Process Clause. He argued that the proceeding at issue was the functional equivalent
of a criminal trial. Under his view, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments should have
applied; failure to extend to juveniles the specific right under these amendments
violated equal protection guarantees. Id. at 60–61 (Black, J., concurring). See Irene
Merker Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of Children Charged With Crime: Proposal for
a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656, 669 (1980) (explaining that
because Justice Black found functional equivalence between delinquency
proceedings and criminal trials, under his total incorporation view of the Fourteenth
Amendment, all guarantees of the Bill of Rights at issue applied).
76
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30–31, 55. After Gault, the Court extended to juveniles
in delinquency proceedings new constitutional rights, but only in two areas. See In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard
governs juvenile prosecutions as well as criminal trials); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519,
531 (1975) (applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to delinquency proceedings).
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relevant inquiry for courts considering whether to extend additional
protections would be whether such protections are necessary to ensure
that delinquency proceedings comport with the “fundamental fairness”
77
mandates of the clause.
2. Inadequate Definition of Role and Purpose
In addition to creating a juvenile right to counsel of narrower scope
than that for adults, the Court also failed to adequately define the role
and purpose of counsel for children, or to do so in a way that accounts
for the unique characteristics of children. It said merely that children in
delinquency proceedings need the assistance of counsel in order “to
cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist
upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether [they have]
78
a defense and to prepare and submit it.”
This definition is at best a bare-bones sketch of what a conscientious
and zealous attorney in juvenile court must do; it ignores, for example,
discussion of any counseling duties, such as whether to accept a plea
offer or proceed to trial. Compounding this problematic definition is the
Gault majority’s failure to address whether or how the incomplete
cognitive development and social and emotional immaturity common to
children and adolescents affect their ability to exercise the right to
79
counsel. Children and adolescents tend to think concretely and have
difficulty with abstract concepts, including the rights at issue in the
delinquency process as well as the significance of exercising or waiving
80
those rights, as numerous studies have shown. In many cases, they
Otherwise, the Court has halted the extension of procedural protections afforded
criminal defendants to juveniles, employing the flexibility of the due process standard
to diminish juvenile rights. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 281 (1984) (statute
authorizing pretrial detention of juveniles without bail pending adjudication based
on a judicial finding of future dangerousness did not run afoul of fundamental
fairness guarantees); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 540–45 (1971) (plurality
opinion) (juveniles not entitled to jury trials under either the Sixth Amendment or
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
77
While the majority never actually used the phrase, justices who issued separate
opinions described the majority’s reasoning as having been based on the
“fundamental fairness” provisions of the Due Process Clause. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at
61–62 (Black, J., concurring); Id. at 72 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). In subsequent cases, the Court characterized Gault this way. See, e.g., Martin,
467 U.S. at 263; Jones, 421 U.S. at 531; McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543.
78
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.
79
See Bishop & Farber, supra note 21, at 135–36; Emily Buss, The Missed
Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 39, 39 (2003) (arguing that Gault, “in
assuming that children’s due process rights would, at best, match those of adults,”
pretermitted thoughtful consideration of a range of changes that would be required
to make the system fair to juveniles).
80
See Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology Goes to
Court, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 9, 25
(Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000); Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the
Child: Interrogating Juveniles After Roper v. Simmons, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 418 &
n.127 (2008) (summarizing studies on difficulties juveniles face understanding their
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understand rights not as legal entitlements that they may choose to assert
or to waive, but as opportunities to be given and taken away at the whim
81
of the adults in their lives. Because they lack a well-developed fund of
82
life experiences, juveniles can make imprudent and hasty decisions.
They also tend to have more difficulty than adults in weighing options,
83
considering long-term consequences, and making choices.
Throughout Gault, the Court demonstrated concern for the
particular vulnerabilities of young people and their need for protection
84
against the overwhelming power of the state. Yet the Court did not
address these same issues with respect to either how they would affect a
child’s relationship with her lawyer or whether a child’s lawyer had any
special ethical responsibilities as a result. The Court failed to clarify
whether an attorney for a child was obliged to take special care to ensure
a child’s comprehension of the complex rights at stake, as well as the
court process. Furthermore, the Court did not articulate whether the
attorney should allow the child client—who is recognized by the Court to
be, in many contexts, immature and unable to make responsible
decisions—to direct the course of her representation. This omission has
resulted in a flurry of conflicting scholarly commentary and
disagreement among courts about whether an attorney should practice

Miranda rights as well as studies pertaining to juvenile competence to stand trial). But
see Robert Epstein & Jennifer Ong, Are the Brains of Reckless Teens More Mature than
Those of Their Prudent Peers?, SCI. AM., Aug. 25, 2009, available at http://www.scientific
american.com/article.cfm?id=are-teens-who-behave-reck (summarizing a study that
purports to show no difference between the brains of risk-taking teens and those of
adults).
81
See Emily Buss, The Role of Lawyers in Promoting Juveniles’ Competence as
Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE
243, 244–45 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (summarizing studies).
82
See, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (“[A] lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults
and are more understandable among the young. These qualities often result in
impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.” (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509
U.S. 350, 367 (1993))). See also Steinberg & Schwartz, supra note 80, at 26.
83
Alan E. Kazdin, Adolescent Development, Mental Disorders, and Decision Making of
Delinquent Youths, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE
JUSTICE, supra note 80, at 33. But see Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent
Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89 (2009) (cautioning against
overreliance on generalizations about youth based on neuroscience).
84
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14–17 (1967) (discussing the historical treatment and
view of children in juvenile court); Id. at 26 (citing studies which show that the lax
attitude of paternalistic courts followed by strict discipline is harmful to the child
“who feels that he has been deceived or enticed”); Id. at 45 (Justice Douglas’s
characterization of a young boy as an “easy victim of the law,” who “cannot be judged
by the more exacting standards of maturity,” during “the period of great instability
which the crisis of adolescence produces” (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599
(1948))); Id. at 48 (confessions obtained from children are especially suspect); Id. at
51–52 (children may be induced to give false confessions by “‘paternal’ urgings” of
officials they feel they can trust); Id. at 52–53 (examples of children who felt
pressured to give false confessions).
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according to a child’s expressed interests or according to the attorney’s
85
view about the child’s best interest.
The contemporary professional and academic consensus is that the
“expressed interest” standard most closely adheres to Gault’s emphasis on
86
the distinctness of a child’s liberty interest. As Professor Martin
Guggenheim has explained, if a child is not given the power to direct his
own counsel, the other due process rights granted by Gault would be
“rendered illusory,” as an attorney could usurp those rights if he believed
87
that doing so was in the child’s best interest. The absence of
authoritative guidance from the Supreme Court has meant that some
courts have ruled that an attorney is not ineffective when he practices
according to his own view of the client’s best interest—even when it
88
conflicts with the client’s expressed interest.
3. Problematic Treatment of Waiver of Counsel by a Juvenile
The Court’s discussion of whether and under what circumstances a
juvenile may waive his right to counsel is problematic. The Court’s
emphasis on the centrality of counsel in ensuring due process would
seem to indicate that it would have critically examined the concept of
waiver in the delinquency context. The Court, however, did not do so
and indicated that the juvenile could waive the right to counsel, and that
the validity of the waiver would be evaluated under a totality-of89
circumstances test imported from adult court. It failed to specifically
examine whether and, if so, how age, cognitive limitation, or immaturity
could render a child’s waiver of counsel invalid; it also did not suggest
any special safeguards for ensuring a child’s waiver was voluntary, such as

85

Henning, supra note 67, at 253 (discussing commentary and conflict).
Martin Guggenheim, The Right To Be Represented but Not Heard: Reflections on
Legal Representation For Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 86 (1984); see also Henning,
supra note 67, at 255 (summarizing articles, professional standards, and model rules
supporting the expressed-interest model for delinquency proceedings).
87
Guggenheim, supra note 86, at 86.
88
See, e.g., In re B.K., 833 N.E.2d 945, 948 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding no per se
conflict of interest for counsel to act as both defense counsel and guardian ad litem
in guilty plea cases); In re R.D., 499 N.E.2d 478, 481 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (same); In re
K.M.B., 462 N.E.2d 1271, 1272–73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (rejecting a juvenile’s claim
that her lawyer’s “best-interest lawyering” deprived her of effective assistance of
counsel when her lawyer made a dispositional recommendation contrary to her
wishes). For an argument that the underpinnings of these holdings have been eroded
by changes in the juvenile court as well as an evolution in scholarly and professional
ethical norms, see Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent-Appellant at 34–38, In re Austin M., No. 4-08-0435 (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 19,
2009) [hereinafter Brief of Juvenile Law Center].
89
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464–65 (1938) (stating that a determination of
whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel depends on the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case and should be made on the
record).
86
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requiring that a child speak with an attorney before waiving his right to
90
be represented by one.
Furthermore, if a child has interests distinct from those of a
91
probation officer or a judge, as the majority indicated, then it would
seem that the Court would not have countenanced a child’s waiver at the
inducement or invitation of one or the other, without the child first
being required to speak with an attorney. Yet that is exactly what Gault
allowed. In jurisdictions around the country, many children in
92
delinquency proceedings appear without counsel. What is more,
delinquency judges frequently permit children to waive counsel without
following procedures created by the courts to ensure that waivers are
93
knowingly and intelligently made.
The perils of allowing children to waive counsel were revealed in the
scandal surrounding two juvenile court judges in northeastern
Pennsylvania charged with taking bribes from juvenile detention center
officials in exchange for sentencing juveniles to their facilities. Half of
94
the children sentenced by one of the judges had waived counsel.
4. The Ambiguous Role of Parents
Yet another issue that has proved confusing for juvenile court
practitioners is the question of the rights and role of parents. The Gault
majority extended to both child and parent the right to counsel. If they
could not afford to pay for an attorney, delinquency courts would
95
henceforth appoint counsel. The majority noted the Arizona court’s
ruling that both a parent and a probation officer could be relied upon to
96
protect a child’s interest in a delinquency proceeding. The majority
90

In 1996, twenty-seven states allow juveniles in delinquency proceedings to
waive their right to counsel. Caeti et al., supra note 67, at 624. In other legal contexts,
the Court has similarly failed to require that state officials take special steps to ensure
juvenile waivers of rights are voluntary. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725
(1979) (holding that the totality-of-circumstances test used to evaluate whether an
adult has waived her rights under Miranda is sufficient to evaluate the same issue for
juveniles).
91
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1967).
92
A 1993 study showed that in many states, less than half of juveniles accused of
delinquency offenses receive counsel; waiver was the most common reason why
juveniles were unrepresented. Caeti et al. supra note 67, at 617–18. See Mary
Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile Courts, 54 FLA.
L. REV. 577 (2002) (offering a historical overview of waiver of counsel in juvenile
court pre- and post-Gault).
93
Berkheiser, supra note 92, at 611–16, apps. C, D (discussing a study finding
that eighty of ninety-nine cases in which a juvenile’s waiver was challenged as invalid
were overturned on appeal).
94
Ian Urbina & Sean D. Hamill, Judges Plead Guilty in Scheme to Jail Youths for
Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A22. See also Juvenile Law Center, http://www.jlc.
org/luzerne (detailing litigation surrounding federal prosecutions and civil suits
involving these judges).
95
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41. The Court did not specify whether “they” referred to
the parents alone, or the parents and the child.
96
Id. at 35.
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explicitly rejected that court’s holding regarding the probation officer,
97
but was less clear regarding its views on the parent. The Court’s lack of
regard for the Arizona court’s position on the probation officer,
combined with the rights-protecting logic driving the opinion, suggests
that the Court would have intended for the parent to play no role in the
child’s representation. And yet, later in the opinion, the Court indicated
that parents can play such a role and can, in fact, waive a child’s right to
98
counsel. The majority indicated that Gerald Gault’s mother had not
99
executed a valid waiver of Gerald’s right to counsel. Yet it appeared to
approve the concept that his mother could have properly waived counsel
100
on his behalf.
In taking this seemingly inconsistent position on waiver, the Court
also failed to discuss or even acknowledge the numerous situations that
might arise in which a parent would have an actual or perceived conflict
with the child that would prevent the parent from acting in the child’s
101
Compounding the confusion about a
best or expressed interest.

97
Id. at 35–36. The relevant portion of the opinion addressing the status of the
parent reads: “The [Supreme Court of Arizona] argued that ‘The parent and the
probation officer may be relied upon to protect the infant’s interests.’ . . . We do not
agree. Probation officers . . . are also arresting officers. They initiate proceedings and
file petitions which they verify, as here, alleging the delinquency of the child; and
they testify, as here, against the child. . . . The probation officer cannot act as counsel
for the child. His role in the adjudicatory hearing, by statute and in fact, is as
arresting officer and witness against the child. Nor can the judge represent the child.”
One could argue that the majority’s “we do not agree” declaration pertains to the
inability of both the parent and the probation officer to protect the interests of the
juvenile. Yet the majority elaborated only on the role that might be played by the
probation officer, essentially ignoring the parent’s role in this regard.
98
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41–42. See discussion supra Part II.C.3 (on waiver of
counsel).
99
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 42.
100
The Court explained, “At the habeas corpus proceeding, Mrs. Gault testified
that she knew that she could have appeared with counsel at the juvenile hearing. This
knowledge is not a waiver of the right to counsel which she and her juvenile son had,
as we have defined it. They had a right expressly to be advised that they might retain
counsel and to be confronted with the need for specific consideration of whether
they did or did not choose to waive the right. If they were unable to afford to employ
counsel, they were entitled in view of the seriousness of the charge and the potential
commitment, to appointed counsel, unless they chose waiver.” Id. at 41–42.
101
Henning, supra note 67, at 255 (noting areas of parent-child conflict such as
where a parent is the party initiating the proceedings against a child or where, in the
course of defending a child, defense counsel will need to introduce information that
could lead to criminal or civil charges against the parent for neglect or contributing
to the delinquency of a minor); Brief of Juvenile Law Center, supra note 88, at 20
(noting attorney’s view that because he had been retained for the juvenile by the
parents who wanted to know “the truth” about what had happened, it would have
been inappropriate for the attorney to proceed solely according to the client’s
expressed interest). In my own ten-year experience as a defender in the juvenile
court, I have witnessed many parents who, out of frustration with their children’s
behavior and a sense of having exhausted all options for addressing it, want their
children to be adjudicated delinquent so that they can receive services available only
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parent’s role was the Court’s reference to a “parent’s right to . . . custody”
of his or her child and its implication that parents have due process
interests in delinquency proceedings because that right is threatened by
102
the commencement of the delinquency case.
The Supreme Court realistically could not have been expected to
anticipate or address each of the above issues pertaining to a juvenile’s
103
right to counsel in a single opinion. Yet the failure of the opinion to
articulate anything other than a bare-bones sketch of a juvenile
defender’s role—and the absence of any subsequent Supreme Court
consideration of these issues—means that attorneys have no definitive
guidance on many practical and ethical issues relevant to how they might
endeavor to represent their clients well, or well enough for their
performance to be considered constitutionally effective assistance of
104
counsel.
5. Declining to Find a Right to Appeal
In addition to failing to take steps to ensure that the child’s right to
counsel would be the right to the effective assistance of counsel, Gault
did nothing to ensure that children harmed by ineffective assistance of
counsel would have an appellate remedy. Indeed, the majority declined
to rule on whether a juvenile who is adjudicated delinquent has the right
105
to appeal or to obtain a transcript of her trial court proceedings. As will
be discussed further in Part III, Gault’s ambiguities and omissions with
respect to the role, purpose, and duties of counsel contribute to the
problem of substandard legal representation. And as will be discussed in
Part IV, the failure of Gault to rule that a juvenile has a constitutional
right to appeal a delinquency finding constitutes one of the systemic
barriers against filing an IAC claim.
through the juvenile court. Such parents have little or no incentive to seek to ensure
that their child is well defended by a zealous and competent attorney.
102
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 34. For a thorough exploration of this point, see
Henning, supra note 67, at 253. The influential developmental psychologists Joseph
Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit argued that the right to counsel extended
by Gault was not a personal right belonging to the child but a collective right of the
family, which would “prevent juvenile ‘justice’ from usurping parental functions.”
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 128–29 (1979).
103
See Rosenberg, supra note 75, at 671 n.69 (suggesting that the Gault majority
decided only what it had to because of the “far-reaching implications of the holdings
that the Court did render”). Multiple issues pertaining to the adjudicatory phase were
similarly reserved. Left undecided were the questions of whether, and to what extent,
the juvenile court may admit hearsay or other normally inadmissible evidence, what
the correct burden of proof is, and whether a juvenile court judge must state the
grounds for his findings when he sits as trier of fact. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 11, 58.
With In re Winship, the Court clarified that the State must prove all allegations against
a juvenile beyond a reasonable doubt. 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970).
104
The failure of the Supreme Court to clarify the practical and ethical issues
discussed is at least in part attributable to the difficulties juveniles have in filing
appeals of their cases through which the question of effective assistance could reach
appellate courts. These difficulties are, of course, the central concern of this Article.
105
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 58.
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III. GAULT ON THE GROUND
The promise of Gault, that delinquency proceedings would no
longer be “kangaroo courts,” is threatened by routine and widespread
substandard representation by attorneys that has plagued the post-Gault
106
juvenile court. The reality is that in today’s juvenile courts, assigning an
attorney to a case does not guarantee that a child’s due process rights will
be honored. Nor does attorney representation mean that the child will
have a voice in the proceedings, an advocate who will try to win her case,
or, if that is not possible, an advocate who will craft the best available
107
This Part will explore the problem of substandard
disposition.
lawyering in juvenile court: what it looks like, why it matters, and why it
occurs so frequently.
A. The Nature and Pervasiveness of Substandard Legal Representation
After Gault, state and national bar associations and judicial
organizations promulgated practice standards and model rules that filled
in some of the gaps in Gault’s right-to-counsel holding discussed in Part
II. These guidelines established that a delinquency attorney should
perform essentially the same duties as are expected of attorneys in adult
criminal court. Additionally, attorneys for juveniles in delinquency
proceedings would be expected to familiarize themselves with their
clients’ educational status and family history. Some of the standards
required attorneys to attend to issues presented by their clients’ youth
and immaturity when those issues were relevant to competency, the
108
state’s ability to prove a case, or the attorney-client relationship. They
106
FELD, supra note 27, at 124–27, 131–35 (summarizing the performance of
defense counsel post-Gault).
107
For a discussion of the importance of dispositional advocacy to excellent
lawyering in the juvenile court, see Barbara Fedders et al., The Defense Attorney’s
Perspective on Youth Violence, in SECURING OUR CHILDREN’S FUTURE: NEW APPROACHES TO
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND YOUTH VIOLENCE 84, 91–100 (Gary S. Katzmann ed., 2002).
108
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require that lawyers work to secure
the client’s interests. They also state that lawyers should be counselors, advisors, and
advocates who are competent, zealous, and free of conflicts of interest. Those
qualities assume a “requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter,”
thoroughness and preparation, and “commitment and dedication to the interests of
the client.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 1 (2006); id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1.
The Rules also call upon attorneys to maintain as “normal” a relationship as possible
with their clients, even when they have diminished decision-making capacity. Id. R.
1.14(a).
Standards drafted jointly by the Institute for Judicial Administration and the
American Bar Association (IJA-ABA) outline the following specific tasks for attorneys
representing juveniles: interviewing clients; investigating cases; keeping clients
informed; advising the accused; engaging in plea discussions; giving opening
statements; presenting evidence; examining witnesses; giving closing arguments;
attending to post-trial motions; investigating sentencing options; and noting appeals
when requested. IJA-ABA standards state that juvenile clients’ youth and immaturity
create additional burdens and responsibilities for their lawyers, requiring lawyers for
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also established that an attorney should practice according to the child’s
expressed interest rather than the attorney’s idea of the child’s best
109
interest.
As suggested by national and state assessments of juvenile defender
systems, the reality is that in spite of the presence of some excellent
public defenders, specialized juvenile defense organizations, private
attorneys, and law students and professors working in juvenile courts
around the country, these performance standards and ethical rules
110
appear to be honored mostly in the breach. In courts across the
country, many attorneys for juveniles do not interview witnesses or visit
111
112
the crime scene. They do not file pre-trial motions. They do not

children to familiarize themselves with their clients’ individual and family histories,
their education, state of physical and mental well-being, and cognitive or
developmental disabilities, which it recognizes as relevant to competency, the ability
of the state to prove the offense, the ability of the juvenile to raise a defense, as well as
to the quality of the attorney-client relationship and the child’s ability to understand
and process information from the attorney. See generally, NAT’L ADVISORY COMM. FOR
JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 273–79 (1980), available at http://www.eric.
ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/contentdelivery/servlet/ERICServlet?accno=ED201923.
In 2004, the National Juvenile Defender Center, and the National Legal Aid and
Defender Association, in partnership with the American Council of Chief Defenders,
promulgated principles for indigent defense systems, which include “public defender
offices, contract, appointed, and conflict counsel, law school clinics, and non-profit
legal providers.” NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., TEN CORE PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDING
QUALITY DELINQUENCY REPRESENTATION THROUGH PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY 3 n.2 (2d
ed. 2008), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/10_Core_Principles_2008.pdf. The
principles urge indigent defense systems to provide quality, specialized, and
independent representation to child clients “throughout the delinquency process.”
Id. at 2. They also recognize that “representing children in delinquency proceedings
is . . . equally as important as[] the representation of adults,” and the need to
“promote a juvenile justice system that is fair, non-discriminatory and rehabilitative.”
Id. at 2–3.
109
See Henning, supra note 67, at 246 (summarizing the relevant standards).
110
A non-exhaustive list includes the Youth Advocacy Project in Boston, MA; the
Children’s Law Center in Lynn, MA; the Juvenile Law Center in Philadelphia, PA;
JustChildren in Charlottesville, VA; the Children and Family Justice Center at
Northwestern Law School; the New York University School of Law Juvenile Rights
Clinic; the Georgetown Juvenile Justice Clinic; and the Barton Clinic at Emory Law
School. See Laura Cohen, New Hope Found in Practice Standards, CRIM. JUST., Winter
2009, at 49 (noting small number of excellent attorneys in juvenile court).
111
See ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & MID-ATL. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., MARYLAND:
AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 31 (2003), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/
mdreport.pdf.
112
See, e.g., ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & JUVENILE LAW CTR., PENNSYLVANIA: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS 5 (2003), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/pareport.pdf (noting
that in Pennsylvania, only one percent of court-appointed counsel reported regularly
filing pre-trial motions other than requests for discovery).
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113

prepare for dispositional hearings. They are by-and-large ill prepared
for the particular challenges presented by bench trials, which are the
114
norm in juvenile court. For reasons including exposure to prejudicial
extra-record evidence about a particular juvenile and political pressure
not to appear soft on crime, judges who sit as finders of fact are typically
115
more skeptical of defense arguments than are juries. Yet most articles
and treatises on trial skills focus on jury trials, with little to no training
116
provided on the special challenges presented by bench trials.
Along with failing to do what would be expected for adult clients,
attorneys also routinely ignore demands that the special characteristics of
youth and the realities of delinquency proceedings place on their
representation. In many instances, for example, attorneys do not meet
with their juvenile clients outside of court appearances. Often, they meet
117
with them for the first time on the day of trial. While this would be a
problematic practice for adult defendants, it is particularly problematic
with juvenile clients. Children, who have little to no experience with
adults—especially adults outside the family—who can be trusted to
pursue their wishes and expressed interests, need to spend time with an
attorney before they can trust him and even consider following his
118
advice. A typical hearing features court officers yelling orders, judges
issuing warnings, prosecutors threatening punishment, and probation
119
Absent repeated and consistent
officers laying down rules.
demonstrations of concern and loyalty from a defender, the child will
likely perceive him as yet one more of what Professor Emily Buss
memorably describes as the “finger-wagging lecturers” that predominate
120
in juvenile court. However well-intended the attorney’s instruction or
advice, if a child’s experience does not indicate that the attorney is on
121
her side, she has no reason to listen.
113
See, e.g., ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & MID-ATL. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., supra
note 111, at 33.
114
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court held that the fundamental
fairness guarantees of the Due Process Clause are not offended by denying juveniles
the right to trial by jury. 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). Only twenty states provide for jury
trials for juveniles as a matter of state statutory or constitutional law. Birckhead, supra
note 3, at 1451.
115
See Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries and Justice:
Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 571–75
(1998).
116
Id. at 586–87.
117
See, e.g., NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., MISSISSIPPI: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS
TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN YOUTH COURT PROCEEDINGS 32
(2007), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/mississippi_assessment.pdf.
118
Buss, supra note 81, at 256–62.
119
Id. at 260.
120
Id.
121
Of course, developing a relationship in which a client will learn to trust an
attorney requires significant expenditures of time. Given the reality of huge,
unmanageable caseloads for many defenders, such expenditures of time may be
impossible. However, this reality does not change the fact that effective assistance
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Children also need complicated legal concepts explained in
language they can understand. Yet many attorneys make no effort to slow
down court hearings, which typically move at lightning-quick speed, or to
ensure their clients’ understanding of the court’s process and its
122
significance. Washington v. A.N.J., a recent Washington Supreme Court
decision allowing a twelve-year-old juvenile’s motion to withdraw a plea to
first-degree sexual molestation based on the court’s finding that the
attorney had been ineffective, offers an egregious but not atypical
123
example of the deficient representation described herein. In that case,
the court found that the attorney met with his client for a total of
approximately ninety minutes prior to the plea hearing, failed to
investigate in a meaningful way, and misinformed the juvenile of the
consequences of the plea—which included possible placement on a sex
124
offender registry for the rest of his life and notification of his school.
Additionally, rather than respect their duty of loyalty and
confidentiality to the child, attorneys may routinely violate client
confidences and have important conversations in the presence of parents
125
or other court personnel. They may not follow their clients’ expressed
wishes and instead insert their own judgment about what is best—even
126
when that runs counter to their clients’ expressed interests. For
example, such attorneys may fail to adequately research and investigate a
case, believing that an adjudication that will lead to probation, and
127
services, is what the child needs most. Even if they do not substitute
their judgment for that of their clients, attorneys may practice a passive
requires time. The lack of a structure that provides for it simply indicates a lack of
political will, likely based on the lack of popularity of expending taxpayer dollars to
adequately fund juvenile defense.
122
See, e.g., NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., FLORIDA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 36 (2006),
available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Florida%20Assessment.pdf. As Emily Buss has
noted, the presence of a jury functions to slow down the court process; because
judges need to be sure that lay people understand the legal proceedings, judges take
more time to give instructions in jury trials. In juvenile court, where most
proceedings are bench trials, there is no jury to provide an external pressure to slow
down the proceedings. Buss, supra note 81, at 252. This makes it incumbent on
attorneys to serve that role.
123
No. 81236-5, 2010 WL 314512 (Wash. Jan. 28, 2010).
124
Id. at *1.
125
Id. at *8, *10, *14 (holding that failure of juvenile’s attorney to provide
opportunity to juvenile to “consult with and confide in his attorney without his
parents present” was factor to be considered in assessing whether plea “was knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent” and ultimately, based on other deficiencies of the attorney,
allowing juvenile to withdraw plea to first-degree sexual molestation). See also Ellen
Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of Holistic
Representation for Children Accused of Crime, 62 MD. L. REV. 288, 344–45 (2003)
(discussing the issue of confidentiality violations committed by juvenile defenders).
126
See, e.g., TEXAS APPLESEED, SELLING JUSTICE SHORT: JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE
IN TEXAS 24 (2000), http://texasappleseed.net/pdf/projects_fairDefenseJ_sell
short.pdf.
127
Marrus, supra note 125, at 290–91.
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version of expressed-interest lawyering in which they blindly follow their
clients’ wishes and do not offer them their counsel or explore
128
alternatives.
In sum, attorneys fail their clients in myriad ways, by neglecting to do
those tasks that would be required of them in adult court and by
neglecting the ways in which youthfulness affects a client’s participation
in a case. The next Sections explore the impact of these failings.
B. The Negative Effects of Poor Lawyering on Youth
Substandard lawyering negatively affects a youth’s case at both the
adjudicatory and dispositional phases. At the adjudicatory phase,
attorneys who do not investigate, file motions, or do legal research are
unable to contest the state’s evidence at trial, thus all but ensuring a
129
delinquent adjudication. Attorneys who are poorly prepared for trial
may be inappropriately eager to resolve a case by way of a guilty plea,
even when more diligent work would have revealed a ground for
suppression of key evidence or a meritorious defense. The rate at which
cases are decided by means of guilty pleas is extraordinarily high in
juvenile court. While no national figures of the rate at which delinquency
cases are resolved by means of a guilty plea are available, state studies
130
indicate that the rate is upward of ninety percent. The high number of
guilty pleas is not entirely attributable to poor legal representation. Yet
the “plea culture” that predominates in juvenile court can countenance

128
Kristin Henning has criticized this version of expressed-interest lawyering as
insufficiently attentive to the realities of what a child client needs from his attorney.
“Because children reason with a relatively small fund of general information and an
even smaller fund of legal information, children need lawyers to help them
understand the full range of options available to them in litigation. In a delinquency
case, for example, the child may be asked to decide whether he will litigate pre-trial
evidentiary issues; plead guilty or assert his right to trial; assert his right to crossexamine government witnesses; and testify on his own behalf. Children have limited
experience in these contexts and need and want the assistance and advice of a
knowledgeable adult and legal advisor.” Henning, supra note 67, at 314.
129
See Emily Buss, supra note 81, at 245 (noting prevalence of “cases in which
judges find against the accused on thin evidence presented in a procedurally
inappropriate manner”).
130
See Mlyniec, supra note 4, at 371, 394 (summarizing studies of four states that
estimated that approximately ninety percent or more of delinquency cases were
resolved by plea). This number parallels that in state and federal criminal courts,
where ninety-one percent of defendants plead guilty. Stephanos Bibas, Judicial FactFinding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1150 &
n.330 (2001) (analyzing Bureau of Justice Statistics data on federal and state
prosecutions). A number of commentators have critiqued the high rate of guilty pleas
in the adult criminal context. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal
Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931
(1983); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1196–
99 (1991); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable? 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037
(1984).
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131

Poor preparation and
lackluster efforts by defense attorneys.
performance by attorneys then encourages clients to plead guilty out of a
132
sense of hopelessness.
The performance of attorneys at the dispositional phase of a
133
delinquency proceeding is frequently poor as well. States provide for
dispositional hearings at which all sides can present witnesses, offer
written memoranda, and make oral arguments designed to procure a
134
Model rules and standards make clear an
particular disposition.
135
attorney’s obligations at the dispositional stage. For juveniles to obtain
the programs and services available to adjudicated delinquents, they
need an attorney to make the case that those services are essential to
136
their rehabilitation. Yet lawyers often fail to obtain education or health
records of their clients or to seek available public funds to hire
independent forensic psychologists or social workers. They instead rely
on probation departments for relevant biographical information on their
137
clients, essentially abdicating their critical role in this process. As such,
their ability to make informed and persuasive dispositional arguments is
limited.
In addition to leading to outcomes the youth experiences as adverse
and unfair at both the adjudication and the dispositional phases,
deficient representation can also negatively affect her prospects for
rehabilitation in more subtle but still significant ways.
Gault recognized that the rehabilitative aspiration of the juvenile
court requires that it adhere to due process, citing a study that concluded
“[u]nless appropriate due process of law is followed, even the juvenile
who has violated the law may not feel that he is being fairly treated and
138
may therefore resist the rehabilitative efforts of court personnel.”
131

F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma M. Saujani, Note, Plea Bargaining and
Convicting the Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16
BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 210 (2002) (describing pressure to move cases quickly to
resolution).
132
See generally Drizin & Luloff, supra note 11, at 292.
133
See Marrus, supra note 125, at 291.
134
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2501(a)–(b) (2007) (describing evidentiary
requirements for dispositional hearing, and establishing that juvenile may present
evidence and advise court concerning disposition believed to be in juvenile’s best
interest).
135
See IJA-ABA JOINT COMM’N ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS
RELATING TO INTERIM STATUS: THE RELEASE, CONTROL, AND DETENTION OF ACCUSED
JUVENILE OFFENDERS BETWEEN ARREST AND DISPOSITION § 8.2 (1980); see also IJA-ABA
JOINT COMM’N ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR
PRIVATE PARTIES § 9.2 (a)–(b) (1980) (proffering standards requiring attorneys to be
familiar with all community services and treatment alternatives available to the court
and to investigate the source of any evidence introduced at a disposition hearing).
136
See Simkins, supra note 66, at 210.
137
See Marrus, supra note 125, at 290–91.
138
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967) (citing STANTON WHEELER & LEONARD S.
COTTRELL, JR., JUVENILE DELINQUENCY—ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL 33 (1966)). See
Bernard P. Perlmutter, “Unchain the Children”: Gault, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and
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Subsequent social science research has demonstrated a causal connection
between whether a youth was treated fairly in court and her likelihood of
139
reoffending. An important component of a child’s perception of
whether the process was fair is her attorney’s performance; if a child
reasonably believes that her attorney did not adequately prepare her
defense, present a dispositional plan, or elicit her views on the case, that
140
child may well view the entire court process as illegitimate.
What is more, the cost to youths of representation by substandard
lawyers is high. Dispositions in juvenile court are becoming longer and
141
Today, most states have multiple areas in which
more punitive.
delinquency adjudications have collateral consequences that follow a
142
A delinquent adjudication can result in
child into adulthood.
143
which decreases a child’s
suspension or expulsion from school,
144
employment options. It can imperil a child’s chances at obtaining
citizenship, permanent residency, or asylum if she is an immigrant; keep
a child on a sex offender registry for multiple years or even, in some
instances, for life; prevent a child from enlisting in the military; keep her
from being accepted by a college or university, or hinder her chances at
obtaining financial aid; disqualify her family from obtaining public
housing; and prevent a child from eventually obtaining employment in

Shackling, 9 BARRY L. REV. 1, 39 (2007) (describing opinion’s focus on child’s feelings
and perceptions of fairness in the process as key elements of the child’s amenability
to rehabilitation and discussing how this insight augurs the approach of therapeutic
jurisprudence scholarship).
139
Birckhead, supra note 3, at 1479 & n.132 (citing studies).
140
See Henning, supra note 67, at 285. “In fact, a model of advocacy that denies
the child a meaningful voice in the attorney-client relationship, and thus in the
juvenile justice system as a whole, may actually hinder the rehabilitative and public
safety objectives of the court. The client who is excluded from the process will be less
likely to disclose important information, less likely to follow through on necessary
steps in the case and less likely to comply with orders issued by a judge who has never
heard or considered the child’s views.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
141
As part of the “tough on crime” movement of the 1980s and 1990s, legislatures
across the country modified their juvenile codes’ enabling clauses to include punitive
language, enacted determinate and mandatory-minimum sentencing statutes, and
reduced confidentiality protections for a subset of juvenile offenders. By the end of
2004, juvenile codes in every state allowed juvenile court records to be released to
prosecutors, law enforcement, social services agencies, schools, and/or victims. Codes
also permitted law enforcement agencies to fingerprint and photograph juveniles
under certain circumstances and exposed a subset of juveniles to some form of
criminal sanctions. Perry L. Moriearty, Combating the Color-Coded Confinement of Kids:
An Equal Protection Remedy, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 297 (2008).
142
See, e.g., Pinard, Difficulties, supra note 7, at 1114–15 (cataloguing collateral
consequences for juveniles).
143
See, e.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.006(b)–(e) (Vernon 2006) (describing
circumstances allowing or mandating placement in alternative education program for
students engaging in felony conduct on or off campus).
144
See john a. powell, Structural Racism: Building Upon the Insights of John Calmore,
86 N.C. L. REV. 791, 796–97 (2008) (discussing the relationship between school
exclusion and labor market chances).
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145

law enforcement. Additionally, a delinquent adjudication enhances
146
adult sentences in all fifty states in one form or another. Furthermore,
approximately half of all states now specify by statute that a prior
delinquent adjudication makes a child eligible for transfer to adult
147
court. Less tangibly but no less significantly, at a time when they are
exploring and establishing their identities, youths labeled “delinquent”
may come to embrace the role—to their own detriment as well as the
148
detriment of society.
C. Reasons for the Pervasiveness of Substandard Representation
The routinely poor performance of defense lawyers in juvenile court
appears to have many root causes. Some pertain to both adult defendants
and juveniles; some are unique to juveniles.
1. Structural Causes
Like adult criminal defendants, most juveniles are poor and thus
149
eligible for appointed counsel. A number of problems endemic to
indigent defense contribute to inadequate representation in both
juvenile and adult courts. High caseloads, inadequate funding, and
insufficient training are common in both adult and juvenile courts and

145

See Pinard, Difficulties, supra note 7, at 1114–15 (noting collateral
consequences of juvenile adjudications in the areas of housing, employment, and
education); 1 RANDY HERTZ ET AL., TRIAL MANUAL FOR DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN JUVENILE
COURT § 14.07, at 365–66 (1991) (discussing immigration consequences, use of
delinquency adjudications as sentencing enhancements, and forfeiture).
146
See A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d 787, 790 (7th Cir. 2004). See also People v. Nguyen,
209 P.3d 946, 948, 957 (Cal. 2009) (finding that juvenile adjudications fall under the
“prior conviction” exception, and later use of that adjudication to enhance adult
sentencing was appropriate) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490
(2000)); State v. Weber, 149 P.3d 646, 649, 653 (Wash. 2006) (en banc) (same)
(citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490); Joseph B. Sanborn Jr., Second-Class Justice, First-Class
Punishment: The Use of Juvenile Records in Sentencing Adults, 81 JUDICATURE 206, 209–10
(1998).
147
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Collateral Consequences of Juvenile Proceedings: Part I,
CRIM. JUST., Summer 2000, at 59.
148
After being accused of being a thief, Jean Genet became one; “[t]hus . . . I
decisively repudiated a world that had repudiated me.” LeninImports.com, Jean
Genet Biography, http://www.leninimports.com/jean_genet.html. For a discussion
of the shame and humiliation associated with involvement in juvenile court, see Paul
R. Kfoury, Confidentiality and the Juvenile Offender, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 55, 56 (1991).
149
See generally NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N, THE REAL WAR ON CRIME 130
(Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996) (study of American crime, noting correlation between
it and poverty). While comparable studies are not available for juvenile court, studies
of criminal courts indicate that up to ninety percent of criminal defendants are
financially eligible for appointed counsel. See Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L.
Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31
(1995).
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contribute to inadequate representation in both court systems. Some
appear to apply with particular force in juvenile court. For example,
151
attorneys for indigent juveniles and adults often have high caseloads.
The numbers are, however, particularly punishing for juvenile
152
defenders. While lack of training characterizes all indigent defense
programs, the problem is particularly acute in juvenile court. Juvenile
courts are often the first stop for recent law graduates, who, after gaining
153
experience, are typically rotated into criminal court to represent adults.
They are also often havens for defenders looking for less scrutiny from
154
their professional peers or their superiors.
An additional set of factors that contributes to inadequate
representation is unique to the juvenile court. These are issues and
problems that arise at least in part because of the gaps and ambiguities in
Gault. But they also reflect long-standing cultural assumptions about
children that Gault, despite bestowing a new set of rights on children, did
not effectively dislodge.
2. Resistance to the Empowerment of Youth and the Persistence of BestInterest Representation
The first such factor is the belief that the consequences of
involvement in juvenile court for a youth are insufficiently serious to
merit a defense attorney’s best and most sustained efforts. As noted in
the state-wide assessment of juvenile delinquency representation in
Georgia, lawyers may rationalize half-hearted preparation on behalf of
juvenile clients based on the fact that these clients, unlike their adult
155
ones, will not face prison time. A related factor is the resistance of
attorneys to the notion that the values and views of their child clients are
worthy of respect. The backdrop to this resistance is the society-wide
belief, sanctioned in centuries of statutory and constitutional law
150

See Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 461, 465, 474 (2007) (discussing problems of lack of funding and high
burnout rate for attorneys which result in defense attorneys with minimal training in
adult criminal court).
151
Steven N. Yermish, Ethical Issues in Indigent Defense: The Continuing Crisis of
Excessive Caseloads, CHAMPION, June 2009, at 22 (describing problem of high caseloads
for defenders of indigent adults and juveniles).
152
Jerry R. Foxhoven, Effective Assistance of Counsel: Quality of Representation for
Juveniles Is Still Illusory, 9 BARRY L. REV. 99, 119 (2007) (noting national studies of
juvenile defense that document caseloads as high as 1,500 cases per year in Virginia).
153
Birckhead, supra note 5, at 1498 (describing phenomenon in North Carolina
of assigning new attorneys to juvenile court).
154
See BARBARA FLICKER, PROVIDING COUNSEL FOR ACCUSED JUVENILES (1983). “In
some defender offices, assignment to ‘kiddie court’ is the bottom rung of the ladder,
to be passed as quickly as possible on the way up to more visible and prestigious
criminal court assignments. Little attention may be paid by superiors to performance
in juvenile court, providing few incentives for hard work.” Id. at 2.
155
ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & S. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AN ASSESSMENT OF
ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 29
(2001), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/georgia.pdf.
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opinions, that children are too immature to be trusted to make choices
156
that have long-term implications. Laws that deny children rights in the
name of protecting them have been repeatedly upheld against
157
constitutional attack. For many attorneys, the relatively recent academic
and professional consensus in favor of client-directed representation runs
strongly counter to their own experiences and belief systems. When these
attorneys practice in one of the many courts around the country that
foster and reward a go-along-to-get-along approach by defense lawyers,
the pressure to abandon the child’s expressed interest may well be
158
overwhelming.
In certain delinquency cases, a lawyer’s view of a child’s best interest
might match the child’s actual and expressed interest such that the goals
of the lawyer and client might be aligned. Yet even in these cases, if the
lawyer allows his own views about the appropriate rights and status of
children to interfere with his client’s exercise of their due process rights,
as described in Part III.A, he has violated the spirit of Gault and likely
contributed to a process, if not an outcome, that the client experiences as
159
adverse.
3. The Trouble with Parents
Another juvenile-specific factor underlying substandard legal
representation, also traceable to the gaps and ambiguities in Gault, is the
reality—and potentially troubling interference—of parents and
guardians. This problem takes many forms. An attorney may experience
conflict when his client expresses a desire to plead guilty but his client’s
parents insist on a trial. In such instances, parents may unreasonably
believe in their child’s innocence, either because their child has been less
than truthful with them or because they refuse to acknowledge that she
160
has broken the law. Conversely, an attorney may be ordered by parents
to pressure the child to take a plea deal, even when the child is insisting
she wants a trial, because the parents do not wish to continue to come to
156

See Martin Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 589, 638 (2002).
157
See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (upholding parental
notification statutes regulating minors’ access to abortion lawful if minors can seek
judicial bypass); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636–37 (1968) (upholding a law
restricting the dissemination of non-obscene, sexually explicit material to individuals
over the age of seventeen).
158
See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order:
The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1129–30 (1991); BARRY
C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE JUVENILE COURTS 238
(1993) (documenting instances where judges sentenced represented juveniles more
harshly than those who were pro se).
159
Marrus, supra note 125, at 290–91, 326–27 (criticizing best-interest lawyering
as harmful to children); Marrus, supra note 9, at 417–19 (same).
160
For a discussion of the tensions and need for collaboration among children,
parents, and attorneys, see Kristin Henning, It Takes a Lawyer to Raise a Child?
Allocating Responsibilities Among Parents, Children, and Lawyers in Delinquency Cases, 6
NEV. L.J. 836, 837–67 (2006).
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court, or want their child to “learn a lesson,” or for any other number of
reasons. If an attorney adheres to his client’s wishes, parents can simply
wait until they are alone with the child and then direct her to plead
guilty, or to accept punitive consequences at home. Such tensions may be
particularly acute when the parents have retained the attorney, who may
experience conflict between the ethical demands of loyalty to a juvenile
client and the reality that parents footing a hefty legal bill may expect to
161
direct the legal representation.
As with best-interest representation, any inclination an attorney may
have to accede to the wishes of a child’s parents instead of a child is
linked to a society-wide belief system sanctioned in law. That is, any rights
possessed by a child are thought to be subordinate to the prerogatives of
162
parents to raise their children as they see fit. In Parham v. J.R., for
example, the Supreme Court ruled that a child’s liberty interest in not
being involuntarily confined in a state mental institution is “inextricably
linked with the parents’ interest in and obligation for the welfare and
163
health of the child.” It followed for the Court that a procedure
authorizing the commitment of a child by her parent over the child’s
objection and in the absence of any adversary pre-admission proceeding
did not offend the Constitution. In its ruling, the Court noted the
presumption in the law that “parents possess what a child lacks in
maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making
life’s difficult decisions,” and that “natural bonds of affection lead
164
parents to act in the best interests of their children.” It does not
ineluctably follow in every case that an attorney experiencing role
conflict because of the presence and involvement of parents will in fact
resolve that conflict against the interests of her client. Nonetheless,
parents’ pressure can make the already difficult work of delinquency
representation even harder.

161
Henning, supra note 67, at 302 (noting problem and noting clear ethical
mandates in Model Rules against allowing paying parent to direct course of
representation).
162
See Guggenheim, supra note 156, at 592 (“[O]ne cannot discuss constitutional
rights of children without recognizing that children must be discussed in relational
terms.”).
163
442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979).
164
Id. at 602. In his concurrence, Justice Stewart explained that because of the
commonality of interest between parents and children, children are in the position of
patients who commit themselves voluntarily, and “voluntary” patients do not require
legal rights or procedural protections. Id. at 622–23. As one commentator memorably
described, “In one quick stroke, Justice Stewart transformed the parent into a
ventriloquist, and the child into Charlie McCarthy; no matter how the voices sound,
they all come from the same place.” Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice:
Appointing Counsel for Children in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1571, 1581
(1996). The presumption of parental fitness is of course subject to the exception of
parental abuse and neglect authorizing state intervention in the family unit. Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769–70 (1982) (holding that clear and convincing
evidentiary standard applies to termination of parental rights proceedings).
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The pressure to practice best-interest lawyering and to cede to wishes
of parents—in other words, to ignore ethical norms and professional
standards—may feel particularly intense because of the closed-door,
rarefied atmosphere of juvenile court. Many states close their juvenile
courtrooms to the public, pursuant to confidentiality statutes presumably
enacted to shield juveniles from the stigma associated with
165
delinquency. Yet closed doors effectively shield lawyers and judges from
scrutiny they might otherwise face from the public and the press. With
more scrutiny, attorneys might take their ethical duties more seriously,
166
and judges might behave more professionally and appropriately.
IV. IN SEARCH OF AN EFFECTIVE APPELLATE REMEDY
There is an appellate remedy—at least in theory—for children who
are harmed by poor lawyering: file an appellate claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel (IAC). This Part will provide the background,
underpinnings, and procedural nuances of that remedy and suggest types
of claims a juvenile might wish to file. It will present findings from a
survey conducted by the author that reveals an extremely low number of
IAC claims filed in delinquency cases over the last ten years. It will then
examine how both legal doctrine and rules and policies governing IAC
claims create nearly insurmountable hurdles for aggrieved juveniles.
A. The Mechanics and Doctrine of a Juvenile IAC Claim
Although Gault did not provide for a juvenile’s right to appeal from
a delinquency adjudication and disposition, the right to direct appeal is
now explicitly provided to children adjudicated delinquent in most states
167
Additionally,
as a matter of state statutory or constitutional law.
165

See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 65 (West 2008) (excluding public
from delinquency proceedings).
166
For a discussion of the arguments for and against confidentiality in juvenile
delinquency proceedings, see Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency
Proceedings: Should Schools and Public Housing Authorities be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
520 (2004). Observers have attributed the scandal surrounding the Pennsylvania
judges who took bribes for sentencing juveniles to detention facilities in part to the
confidentiality provisions that apply to the state’s juvenile proceedings. Ian Urbina &
Sean D. Hamill, Judges Plead Guilty in Scheme to Jail Youths for Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2009, at A22. In his concurring and dissenting opinion in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
Justice Brennan noted that the value of fundamental fairness could be honored in a
bench-trial delinquency system only where that system was open to public exposure,
so that the “accused may in essence appeal to the community at large, by focusing
public attention upon the facts of his trial, exposing improper judicial behavior to
public view, and obtaining, if necessary, executive redress through the medium of
public indignation.” 403 U.S. 528, 555 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring). This insight
applies equally to defense lawyers who behave improperly.
167
Statutes which establish the right to appeal: ALA. CODE § 12-15-601
(LexisNexis Supp. 2008); ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.120 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8325 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-325(f) (2008); CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 395 (West
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appellate courts have assumed the authority to hear juvenile appeals
168
based on arguments of IAC. Further, national standards have been
promulgated stating that an appellate attorney has an ethical obligation
to comb the record for ineffective assistance and to make an IAC claim
169
where one is warranted. Thus, a structure is in place in which a child
can bring an IAC claim.

2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-142 (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1051
(1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.01 (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-3 (2008); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 571-11 (2006); ILL. CT. R. & P. 604 (West 2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3215-1 (LexisNexis 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.133 (West 2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
610.130 (LexisNexis 2008); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 330 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit.15, § 3402 (Supp. 2009); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-301 (LexisNexis
2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 119, § 56(g) (West 2008); MICH. CT. R. 3.993
(2009); MINN. R. CT. 21.03 (2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.261 (West 2004); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 41-5-1423 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-287.06 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. §
62D.500 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:29 (LexisNexis 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:4A-40 (West 1987); N.M. R. ANN. 10-251 (2009)); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1112
(McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2602 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-56
(2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2501.02 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 2-2601 (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 419A.200 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-52 (2002);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-159 (2005); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 56.01 (Vernon 2009)
(appeal is limited); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5113 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-296
(Supp. 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.033 (West 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 495-13 (LexisNexis 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-233 (2009). Constitutions which
provide the right to appeal: PA. CONST. art. V, § 9; UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 5. There is
no reference in the state codes of Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, South
Carolina or South Dakota to a juvenile’s right to appeal. But see Marc M. Arkin,
Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L. REV. 503 (1992)
(some form of appellate review is provided by statute in every state); 1 HERTZ ET AL.,
supra note 145, at 913 (“If a State allows appeals of criminal convictions, a juvenile
respondent who is not given a statutory right to appeal may be able to contend that
this disparate treatment violates the equal protection of the laws.”).
168
One notable outlier is Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Easterbrook,
who suggested, in a dissenting opinion in a case in which a juvenile was granted relief
pursuant to a habeas petition, that juveniles are not entitled to effective assistance
because Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and progeny are based on the
Sixth Amendment (which does not govern the juvenile right to counsel). A.M. v.
Butler, 360 F.3d 787, 806 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Easterbrook
surely puts the doctrinal cart before the horse here; as asserted infra Part V, the
question that should concern appellate courts is the appropriate constitutional
standard by which to assess juvenile claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, not
whether juveniles are entitled to effective assistance in the first instance, a matter
which In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), settled.
169
Lee Teitelbaum, Standards Relating to Counsel for Private Parties, in IJA-ABA
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS ANNOTATED: A BALANCED APPROACH 69 (Robert E.
Shepherd, Jr. ed., 1996). Standard 10.7(a) provides that, “A lawyer appointed or
retained to represent a client previously represented by other counsel has a good
faith duty to examine prior counsel’s actions and strategy. If, after investigation, the
new attorney is satisfied that prior counsel did not provide effective assistance, the
client should be so advised and any appropriate relief for the client on that ground
should be vigorously pursued.” Id. at 94.
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Nearly all appellate courts evaluate such claims using the two-prong
170
test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, or a state constitution-based
171
analog. The Strickland test requires a showing by the juvenile that; (1)
his attorney’s performance fell below objective standards of reasonable
attorney performance; and (2) but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
there existed a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding
172
would have been different. When both prongs of the test are satisfied,
the representation is defective and the juvenile is entitled to a new
173
adjudicatory or dispositional hearing, or to withdraw a plea.
B. Types of Claims that Are, or Could Be, Filed by Juveniles
Reviewing courts have found trial counsel for juveniles ineffective for
failing to file an appeal of an adjudication based on insufficient
174
failing to move to suppress an involuntarily obtained
evidence;
confession without which, the juvenile indicated in a habeas corpus

170
466 U.S. at 687. Strickland held that the test should govern the adjudicatory
and sentencing phases of capital trials as well as the adjudicatory phase of non-capital,
adult criminal cases. The facts of the case did not require a consideration of whether
the test would apply to sentencing phases of non-capital trials or to delinquency cases,
and the Court did not reach beyond the facts to decide that question. Id. The test was
later applied to guilty pleas. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).
171
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bart B., 679 N.E.2d 531, 534 (1997) (stating that
the determination of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by Strickland); State
v. Dawson, 768 So. 2d 647, 650 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (citing several state cases that
analyzed ineffective assistance of counsel claims under two-prong Strickland test,
finding that juvenile defendants did not meet either prong when their attorney
stipulated to probable cause prior to transfer hearing). See also Marrus, supra note 9,
at 393 n.4 (2003) (cataloguing cases in which Strickland standard utilized in juvenile
appeals featuring IAC claims).
In Hawaii, the state Supreme Court has rejected the Strickland test in measuring
ineffectiveness of counsel for adults and juveniles for all claims brought under both
the Hawaii State Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. State v. Smith, 712 P.2d 496,
500 n.7 (Haw. 1986). Finding the test’s prejudice requirement unduly burdensome
for defendants, the state’s high court has ruled that individuals raising ineffective
assistance of counsel claims need only show “specific errors or omissions . . .
reflecting counsel’s lack of skill, judgment, or diligence,” and that “these errors or
omissions resulted in either the withdrawal or substantial impairment of a potentially
meritorious defense.” State v. Antone, 615 P.2d 101, 104 (Haw. 1980).
172
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694.
173
See Hill, 474 U.S. at 58; Strickland, at 687. Additionally, where a state actor
deprives a defendant of access to an attorney or interferes in the attorney-client
relationship, or an attorney is burdened by conflicts of interest, a defendant is
presumed to have been denied effective assistance of counsel without needing to
meet the two-prong test. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 649–50 (1984);
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345, 348 (1980).
174
See, e.g., In re Anthony J., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 865, 867, 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(insufficient evidence to sustain the adjudication in case of receiving stolen motor
vehicle after finding juvenile’s counsel ineffective for failing to preserve right to
appeal).
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175

proceeding, he would not have made an admission; erroneously
advising a juvenile about the possibility of a deferred disposition prior to
176
adjudication; and sending subpoenas to key defense witnesses with the
177
incorrect date of return. Juveniles have also had success raising claims
of IAC based on substandard lawyering that resulted from a lawyer’s
178
excessively high caseload.
In addition to claims based on the types of deficient trial counsel
performance discussed above that are common to both juvenile and
adult criminal court, juveniles also are harmed when their attorneys
substitute their own views of what is best for their child clients’ expressed
wishes. As argued above, best-interest lawyering can negatively affect both
the outcome and the child’s experience of the process in a particular
case. Specifically, where an attorney’s actions on behalf of a client are
limited or constrained by his own view of what is best for the client, he is
arguably unable to provide assistance of counsel that is “not diluted by
179
conflicting interests or inconsistent obligations.” In these instances, he
will have provided ineffective assistance. At least one court has
acknowledged that best-interest lawyering in a delinquency case could
180
constitute such a conflict of interest.
Juveniles are also harmed when their attorneys do not account for
their cognitive deficits and immaturity in ways that affect the outcome. In
theory, they should be able to bring IAC claims on this basis. Yet a search
for IAC claims arising out of cases where an attorney prejudicially failed
to attend to a child’s cognitive or maturity deficits uncovered only one
181
such claim. While it is of course possible that such claims have been
175
In re Matthew K., No. E031468, 2002 WL 31840658, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec.
19, 2002) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to challenge coerced
and inadmissible confession, reversing delinquency adjudication and remanding the
case). See also In re S.E., No. 22458, 2008 WL 2404039, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 13,
2008) (finding counsel ineffective for failing to renew at trial motion to suppress
statement).
176
State v. B.J.S., 169 P.3d 34, 39 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (reversing adjudication
after finding attorney’s failure to advise juvenile that deferred disposition was possible
undermined confidence in the outcome of a guilty plea).
177
In re Parris W., 770 A.2d 202, 209–10 (Md. 2001) (finding juvenile’s lawyer
ineffective for incorrectly listing the date of subpoenas for five corroborating
witnesses after reviewing their potential statements and determining juvenile could
have presented a sound alibi defense).
178
In re Edward S., 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 725, 741 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (counsel
ineffective in sex offense case for failing to investigate potentially exculpatory
material and failing to move for substitution of counsel knowing he was unable to
devote required time to case).
179
People v. Spreitzer, 525 N.E.2d 30, 34 (Ill. 1988). In instances where a
defendant can demonstrate a conflict of interest, the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance is implicated. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980).
180
State v. Joanna V., 94 P.3d 783, 786–87 (N.M. 2004) (counsel required to
follow client’s express interest rather than attorney’s belief in best interest).
181
In re Victoria D., 864 N.Y.S.2d 13, 14 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (denying juvenile’s
claim that her attorney provided ineffective assistance at trial by failing to ensure that
she understood that once the defense rested she was no longer able to testify).
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filed and rejected in unpublished opinions that are not reported in
Westlaw or Lexis, the near-total absence of such claims in opinions that
do appear in these search engines suggests otherwise.
C. Juvenile IAC Claims: Few and Far Between
Juveniles file IAC claims on any grounds very infrequently. Between
1995 and 2005, the last year for which comprehensive data are available,
182
over six million youths were adjudicated delinquent. In that same time
period, in all fifty states, only 290 adjudicated juveniles filed IAC claims
183
that resulted in opinions published by Westlaw and/or LexisNexis.
184
Among those cases, only forty-one IAC claims yielded appellate relief.
While precise numbers documenting the national scope of IAC over that
same ten-year period do not exist, the incidence of substandard
representation—as measured in statewide and national assessments of
the National Juvenile Defender Center—does not appear to be reflected
in the low number of IAC claims brought on behalf of juveniles harmed
185
by poor representation. While it is not possible to say definitively why so
182

The total number of delinquency adjudications between 1995 and 2005 was,
according to the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 6,314,800. See
C. PUZZANCHERA & W. KANG, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE COURT
STATISTICS DATABOOK: CASE PROCESSING (2008), http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/
jcsdb/asp/process.asp.
183
The methodology I employed to arrive at this number is as follows. I first
searched the “All States” database in Westlaw for cases in which the words “juvenile”
and “appeal” appeared in the case summary. I then searched those cases for “effective
assistance” or “ineffective assistance,” while excluding the word “dependency,” which
would have found abuse and neglect rather than delinquency cases. I then performed
a similar search on LexisNexis using “juvenile” or “minor w/s delinqu!” and “appeal”
and “ineffective w/2 assistance” and “HEADNOTES(juvenile).” I then excluded all
claims on behalf of juveniles tried as adults, except for any hearings in the juvenile
court pertaining to whether a transfer to adult court would occur, as the analysis in
this Article does not necessarily apply to cases of juveniles tried in adult court, who
are often represented by attorneys different from those who typically appear in
juvenile court, operating under different circumstances. Establishing conclusive data
regarding juvenile IAC claims proves difficult for a number of reasons, including
variations among states in reporting unpublished legal opinions to Lexis Nexis and
Westlaw, limitations in search engines including the unavailability of parameters
restricting searches to juvenile court, and inconsistent terminology among court
systems.
184
Research on file with Author. I included in this number cases in which
appellate courts specifically allowed the IAC claim(s); cases in which relief was
provided only on other grounds are not included. See, e.g., In re Orr, No.
1999AP040032, 2000 WL 502692, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2000) (reversing
conviction of juvenile for grand theft of a motor vehicle on ground that trial court
improperly conducted plea colloquy and ruling that claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel was moot).
185
A number of methodological problems make it impossible to state definitively
that appellate attorneys inappropriately underutilize IAC claims relative to the rate of
substandard legal representation. For one, as discussed supra note 183, many
unpublished appellate opinions are not reported. Additionally, attorneys may initially
file IAC claims in appeals which their clients ultimately decide to withdraw. Finally,
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few IAC claims are brought when the preceding discussion would seem to
indicate that many more are warranted, a multitude of legal and practical
factors do function to make it extremely difficult for juveniles to bring
and prevail on IAC claims. The remaining Sections in this Part consider
these impediments.
D. Doctrinal and Systemic Impediments
Among the most significant barriers to bringing and prevailing on a
186
meritorious IAC claim is the Strickland standard. This case governs adult
187
and juvenile IAC practice. The Strickland test has facilitated extremely
deferential appellate review of trial attorney performance—so deferential
that for sixteen years after the decision was issued, the Supreme Court
188
failed to find ineffective assistance in a single case. In considering the
test’s first prong, lower courts hearing IAC claims are instructed by
Strickland to presume that conduct of trial counsel falls within the “wide
189
This presumption is
range of reasonable professional assistance.”
strongest where counsel can justify what appear to be questionable
190
actions as “strategy” or “tactics.”
juveniles harmed by deficient representation may not, for any number of reasons,
seek to pursue an appeal—they may wish to simply put the incident behind them, or
they may never learn of their right to appeal, to name two of the most obvious.
Criminal law scholars have similarly suggested that the rate of substandard
representation in adult criminal court significantly outpaces the number of IAC
claims. Primus, supra note 17, at 683–84 & n.23 (summarizing judicial opinions and
commentary noting the relatively low numbers of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims).
186
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
187
As developed further infra, Strickland is based on the Sixth Amendment, and
not the Due Process Clause, which anchors the juvenile right to counsel. The case did
not discuss delinquency cases at all. Thus, it is not clear that Strickland need be the
governing standard. Yet a Westlaw search of published opinions pertaining to juvenile
delinquency appeals did not reveal that any litigant had raised a challenge to the use
of the Strickland standard as a means of assessing ineffective assistance of counsel.
188
John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like Deja Vu All Over Again”:
Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the
Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 133–34
(2007). See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 788–90, 794, 813 (1987) (finding no
ineffective assistance of counsel where capital defense counsel presented no
mitigating case whatsoever at his sentencing hearing, conducted almost no
investigation to prepare for the sentencing hearing, met with the defendant for only
about six hours to prepare for both the guilt and the sentencing phases of the trial,
and failed to uncover any of the evidence later uncovered by habeas counsel of the
defendant’s extremely abusive family and his own psychological problems); Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 186–87 (1986) (finding no ineffective assistance of
counsel). In 2000, the Supreme Court ended the drought. Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 395–99 (2000) (poor preparation for sentencing phase constituted
ineffective assistance).
189
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
190
Id. (“[A reviewing] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the
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The second prong, which obligates defendants to demonstrate “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
191
result of the proceeding would have been different,” has proven as
192
difficult to meet as the first, if not more so. Where a reviewing court
believes a prosecutor’s case to have been strong, even a showing of
egregiously deficient representation will not win the defendant a new
193
trial. In fact, the ruling in Strickland allows appellate courts to forego
any assessment of attorney performance whatsoever and move directly to
194
This requirement
evaluation of the prejudice requirement.
problematically places defendants in a logical bind: Where trial counsel
failed to do adequate factual investigation, file motions or consult with
experts, defendants cannot establish whether or how the outcome might
have been different. What might have been exculpatory evidence is not
195
found or indeed even sought. In this way, the prejudice requirement
works as a demand for the defendant to demonstrate factual
196
innocence.
The Court’s reasons for creating such a deferential test for
measuring effective assistance were instrumentalist ones: concern that a
less deferential test would open the floodgates for appeals of unhappy
convicted defendants, as well as a fear that more exacting scrutiny would
197
The Court
discourage attorneys from accepting appointed cases.
defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”). See, e.g., Cable v.
State, 540 So. 2d 769, 774 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (finding that defendant did not
meet burden of showing professional error or prejudice on three claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel because attorney’s failure to move for suppression of search
evidence was “an exercise of reasonable professional judgment”).
191
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
192
Stephen B. Bright, The Death Penalty and the Society We Want, 6 PIERCE L. REV.
369, 374 n.16 (2008) (“[E]ven when a defendant receives deficient representation,
the conviction and sentence may be upheld based upon a reviewing court’s
conclusion that it did not matter all that much.”).
193
For an argument that appellate efforts to scrutinize a trial record resulting in
conviction are subject to confirmatory biases whereby guilty verdicts appear
inevitable, see Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 2 (2004).
194
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
195
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.10(d), at 671 (5th ed.
2009) (“[I]n case after case alleging that counsel’s factual investigation was
inadequate, the standard response is that there has been no showing of prejudice
because defendant has failed to establish exactly what further evidence existed for
counsel to discover if he had investigated more thoroughly.”).
196
See, e.g., Vanessa Merton, What to Do When You Meet a “Walking Violation of the
Sixth Amendment” if You’re Trying to Put that Lawyer’s Client in Jail? 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
997, 1024 n.69 (2000) (“In effect, Strickland means that the ‘factually guilty’
defendant does not deserve the same right to effective assistance of counsel as the
‘innocent’ defendant.”).
197
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–90. As Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker explain,
“[t]he Court was remarkably candid about its fear of opening the floodgates of
litigation and the unfairness of evaluating attorney decision-making with the benefit
of hindsight. Thus, the Court refused to create any ‘checklist’ of specific minimum
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bolstered these policy considerations with this doctrinal pronouncement:
“[T]he purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation,
although that is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system.
The purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair
198
As a result of the deferential test created by Strickland,
trial.”
ineffectiveness claims have failed where the trial attorney has been
199
200
201
202
asleep, drunk or on drugs, unprepared, or utterly inept. Strickland
203
has been toothless.
In addition to the difficulty of meeting the Strickland standard,
several other factors impede the filing of IAC claims on behalf of
juveniles. For one, some defender offices create a strong potential for

requirements for adequate representation and exhorted lower courts to accord a
‘strong presumption’ of adequacy of representation and to give deference to attorney
strategy.” Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Opening a Window or Building a Wall?
The Effect of Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Law and Advocacy on Criminal Justice More
Broadly, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 192 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
198
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
199
See McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 505 & nn.19–20 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996) (holding that seventy-two-year-old lawyer in capital case who said he
“customarily take[s] a short nap in the afternoon” was not ineffective where napping
might have been a “strategic” move to generate jury sympathy and where co-counsel
remained awake).
200
See People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419, 440 (Cal. 1989). See also, Frye v. Lee, 235
F.3d 897, 907 (4th Cir. 2000) (admitting the court was troubled by defense counsel’s
“decades-long routine of drinking approximately twelve ounces of rum each evening”
but denying ineffective assistance claim where there was no showing of specific
instances of defective performance); Gardner v. Dixon, No. 92-4013, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 28147, at *17–36 (4th Cir. Oct. 21, 1992) (per curiam) (refusing to vacate
petitioner’s death sentence where petitioner had several affidavits demonstrating
counsel was severely addicted to cocaine and alcohol and used both substances
throughout trial because evidence was not newly discovered and defendant made no
showing that trial would have resulted in a different outcome absent the drug and
alcohol use); Berry v. King, 765 F.2d 451, 454 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding that regardless
of whether or not counsel used drugs during trial, “under Strickland, the fact that an
attorney used drugs is not, in and of itself, relevant to an ineffective assistance
claim”). See generally Kirchmeier, supra note 14, at 427.
201
Thomas v. Kemp, 796 F.2d 1322, 1324 (11th Cir. 1986) (sentencing
schizophrenic youth to death despite his lawyer’s failure to present evidence of
mental impairment because denial of assistance of counsel was harmless error).
202
See generally, Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1839 & nn.31–33 (1994)
(describing Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587 (11th Cir. 1984), where defense attorney
in capital case was asked to name a criminal law case but could name only Miranda
and Dred Scott). An abundance of scholarship condemns the Strickland standard as too
lax to ensure effective assistance. See generally, Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System,
Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 59 (1986); Klein, supra note 14, at 1467; Kirchmeier, supra note 14, at 427;
Rigg, supra note 14.
203
Bibas, supra note 193, at 6 (“Strickland winds up being almost as toothless as
rational-basis review under the Equal Protection Clause, which also rests on post hoc
rationalizations instead of actual reasons.”).
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conflict of interest when they assign an appellate attorney to represent a
client where that client was represented by an attorney from the same
204
office at the trial level. An attorney is extremely unlikely to raise a claim
205
of ineffective assistance against herself or someone in her office. While
many appellate defender offices instruct an appellate attorney to
withdraw if she believes there may be IAC issues in the record, selfprotective psychological biases might well make it difficult for the
appellate attorney to recognize or admit that her own conduct at the trial
206
level might constitute a legitimate instance of IAC.
Second, an appellate court is limited on direct appeal to reviewing
207
the trial record, and while there are cases in which IAC is so clear from
208
the trial record that a child could win on direct appeal, much of what
constitutes ineffective assistance for juveniles occurs outside of the trial.
Defense counsel’s failure to investigate, and some conflicts of interest, for
example, are not issues that would be apparent from the trial record. An
204
See, e.g., Burns v. Gammon, 173 F.3d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 1999) (where direct
appeal will raise issue of ineffectiveness, conflict of interest exists if appellate attorney
is same, or from the same office, as trial counsel).
205
Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 502–03 (2003) (concluding that in the
habeas context “ineffective-assistance claims usually should be excused from
procedural-default rules because an attorney who handles both trial and appeal is
unlikely to raise an ineffective-assistance claim against himself.”).
206
United States v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
the defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to be represented by new counsel, since
trial counsel would have an inherent conflict of interest in vigorously advocating the
interests of his client).
207
Some jurisdictions allow for ineffective assistance claims that pertain to issues
outside the record by allowing for direct appeals; however, this is not the majority
rule. Primus, supra note 17, at 680. See Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 734–36
(Pa. 2002) (surveying federal and state jurisdictions and summarizing general rule
that only claims that can be adequately reviewed on the existing record may be
brought on direct appeal).
208
There are numerous cases in which the “deficient performance” prong of
Strickland was satisfied by a lawyer’s failure to make what would have been a
meritorious objection at trial. See, e.g., Girts v. Yanai, 501 F.3d 743, 756–57 (6th Cir.
2007) (concluding “[t]his inaction simply cannot be characterized as litigation
strategy” when trial counsel committed ineffective assistance by failing to object to
prosecutor’s closing argument references to accused’s constitutionally protected
silence); Ege v. Yukins, 485 F.3d 364, 378–79 (6th Cir. 2007) (defense counsel was
ineffective, thereby supplying “cause,” by failing to object to lack of proper
foundation for prosecution bite-mark expert’s testimony); Martin v. Grosshans, 424
F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[D]efense counsel performed deficiently for failing to
make the proper objections” to inadmissible, prejudicial testimony by prosecution
witnesses and “for failing to move for a mistrial after the prosecution’s [improper and
prejudicial] closing argument”); Cox v. Donnelly, 387 F.3d 193, 199–200 (2d Cir.
2004) (“Where counsel . . . repeatedly fails to object to a clearly unconstitutional
charge on the key issue in a criminal case” and where the state’s characterization of
counsel’s conduct as “deliberate tactic” is “implausible,” the state court’s “rejection of
an ineffectiveness claim . . . simply cannot be viewed as reasonable”); Washington v.
Hofbauer, 228 F.3d 689, 702 (6th Cir. 2000) (“This Court has on several occasions
found that a counsel’s failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct constitutes
defective performance . . . .”).
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adjudicated delinquent would have to raise an IAC claim based on these
209
issues in a collateral, post-conviction proceeding, yet few states appoint
210
post-conviction counsel to juveniles or adults. Furthermore, a number
of states require that a juvenile must be in state custody in order to raise a
claim of ineffective assistance via a state post-conviction proceeding, so
unless a juvenile’s attorney’s ineffectiveness is apparent from the record,
211
the un-incarcerated juvenile may not file an IAC claim.
Third, there is no guarantee that an attorney appointed to appeal a
conviction or sentence, whether on direct appeal or collateral
212
proceedings, will perform any better than trial counsel. While the
Supreme Court has held that criminal defendants are entitled to effective
213
assistance in pursuing their direct appeals, no state or federal court has
209

Primus, supra note 17, at 680. Failing to raise an IAC claim on direct appeal
does not bar the claim from being brought in a post-conviction, collateral
proceeding. See Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504.
210
The Supreme Court has held that a state is not required to appoint counsel to
represent indigent defendants in collateral attacks on their convictions and
sentences. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481
U.S. 551, 556–57 (1987). While McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 859 (1994), made
appointed counsel mandatory for all indigent capital prisoners in federal habeas
corpus proceedings, most states do not provide for attorneys in non-capital cases. See
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (right to appointed counsel does
not extend to appeal from state habeas trial court judgment); Finley, 481 U.S. at 555;
United States v. Prows, 448 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2006) (right to counsel does
not extend to post-conviction proceedings); Lopez v. Wilson, 426 F.3d 339, 340–41,
352 (6th Cir. 2005) (right to appointed counsel does not extend to application to
reopen case because of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, because such
motion is collateral rather than direct review); United States v. Harrington, 410 F.3d
598, 600 (9th Cir. 2005) (right to counsel does not extend to petitioner’s motion for
new trial after completion of direct appeal and habeas petition); United States v.
Berger, 375 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (right to appointed counsel does not
extend to post-conviction, post-appeal Rule 33 motion); Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238,
250 (4th Cir. 2003) (right to appointed counsel does not extend to federal habeas
proceedings); United States v. Riggs, 314 F.3d 796, 799 (5th Cir. 2002) (right to
appointed counsel does not extend to post-conviction proceedings); Ellis v. United
States, 313 F.3d 636, 652–53 (1st Cir. 2002) (right to appointed counsel does not
extend to habeas proceedings); McKethan v. Mantello, 292 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir.
2002) (right to appointed counsel does not extend to state collateral proceedings);
Reagan v. Norris, 279 F.3d 651, 656 (8th Cir. 2002) (right to counsel does not extend
to post-conviction proceedings “because such proceedings are usually civil in
nature”).
211
See, e.g., Mason v. State, 914 S.W.2d 751, 751–52 (Ark. 1996) (holding that
since child’s guilty plea resulted in probation, minor not permitted to raise
ineffective assistance of counsel). Habeas proceedings in federal court have more
relaxed requirements; rather than requiring actual custody, federal law holds that
anyone who, “as a result of action by a state or federal criminal court, is ‘subject to
restraints not shared by the public generally’” meets the “‘status’ jurisdictional
requirement in the habeas corpus statute.” RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 8.2a, at 392–93 (5th ed. 2005) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973)).
212
See Bright, supra note 192, at 374.
213
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985).
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required that the assistance of counsel provided in any collateral attack
on a conviction, adjudication, sentence, or disposition be constitutionally
214
effective assistance.
In addition to the obstacles that prevent juveniles from filing claims
of IAC, additional disincentives exist for lawyers to appeal delinquency
215
cases on any grounds whatsoever. While nearly all states now provide a
right to appeal, most of them do not provide for an attorney to help a
216
child exercise that right. Douglas v. California establishes that where a
state provides for the right to appeal, equal protection requires it to
217
provide counsel for indigent appellants; this case would appear to apply
with equal force in juvenile court. However, in a 1995 survey, thirty-two
percent of juvenile public defenders stated they were not authorized to
handle appeals. Only one in five attorneys took any appeals the previous
218
year. Because Gault did not hold that a child has a constitutionally
protected right to appeal, states may lawfully deny them the right to
appeal as well. And while, under Douglas, it would appear that if they
provide the right to appeal they must provide appellate counsel, in many
instances counsel is not in fact being provided.
While some states fund public defender agencies, which can elect to
appoint counsel to appeal delinquency cases, these agencies tend not to
prioritize juvenile appeals in determining how to allocate their scarce
219
appellate resources, so unless a youth adjudicated delinquent takes the
initiative to contact the local public defender to request representation,
his appellate rights are unlikely to be actualized. Additionally, some state
provisions allow for the state to recoup costs from the family of a juvenile

214
See Finley, 481 U.S. at 555 (holding that there is no right to effective assistance
of counsel in state collateral proceedings). Cf. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 617–18
(1974) (holding that no right to effective assistance of counsel exists when seeking a
discretionary appeal following an appeal of right).
215
See, e.g., Donald J. Harris, Due Process vs. Helping Kids in Trouble: Implementing the
Right to Appeal from Adjudications of Delinquency in Pennsylvania, 98 DICK. L. REV. 209,
220, 228 (1994) (reporting that public defenders filed about ten times as many
appeals for adult defendants as for delinquents and attributing the differences to
juvenile defense lawyers’ internalization of parens patriae ideology); Patricia Puritz &
Wendy Shang, Juvenile Indigent Defense: Crisis and Solutions, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2000, at
22, 23 (reporting that public defenders and court appointed counsel rarely, if ever,
file appeals).
216
Those states with statutes providing for counsel to juveniles on appeal are:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-325 (2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.133 (West 2006) (as
interpreted by Chambers v. Dist. Court of Dubuque County, 152 N.W.2d 818, 820
(Iowa 1967)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3404 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-39
(West 1987); N.M. R. ANN. 10-251 (2009); TENN. R. JUV. P. 36 (2009); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 56.01 (Vernon 2009); and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-233 (2009).
217
372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1993).
218
See PATRICIA PURITZ ET AL., ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS 10 (1995). See generally Marrus, supra note 125.
219
See Puritz & Shang, supra note 215, at 23; Harris, supra note 215, at 220, 224.
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220

whose appeal is unsuccessful. Such rules create sharp disincentives for
children to bring an appeal based on any ground. Appellate defender
attorneys and organizations may not prioritize juvenile appeals in part
because of a perception that the stakes are insufficiently high.
Delinquency adjudications result in relatively short sentences overall, as
221
compared with adult criminal defendants. The average amount of time
it takes for an appeal—adult or juvenile—to make its way through the
222
appeals process is four years. The average length of a juvenile sentence
223
is considerably shorter than four years —so short as to create a
224
disincentive for adjudicated delinquents to bother with an appeal. Yet,
as argued above in Part III.B, collateral consequences make adjudications
harmful to the child in the long run, suggesting that the better practice
would be for juveniles with meritorious IAC claims to consider seeking
counsel to file them.
V. REMEDYING THE REMEDY
It seems clear that juveniles harmed by deficient representation do
not at present have a meaningful legal remedy in ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. In order to ensure that juveniles have the means to file
appropriate IAC claims, several reforms addressing the practical and
legal impediments discussed in Part III must occur. The remainder of the
Article will offer some preliminary thoughts toward reform.
State legislatures and judiciaries must take steps to ensure that
provisions are made for juveniles to exercise the right to appeal granted
225
by every state. Only some states require that a child be informed of the
220

See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-450.1 (2007) (providing for payment by parent
or guardian unless juvenile prevails on appeal). “It is the intent of the General
Assembly that, whenever possible, if an attorney or guardian ad litem is appointed
pursuant to G.S. 7A-451 for a person who is less than 18 years old or who is at least 18
years old but remains dependent on and domiciled with a parent or guardian, the
parent, guardian, or any trustee in possession of funds or property for the benefit of
the person, shall reimburse the State for the attorney or guardian ad litem fees,
pursuant to the procedures established in G.S. 7A-450.2 and G.S. 7A-450.3. This
section shall not apply in any case in which the person for whom an attorney or
guardian ad litem is appointed prevails.” Id.
221
See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STATISTICAL
BRIEFING BOOK: JUVENILES IN CORRECTIONS (2008), http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/
corrections/qa08405.asp (see Custody Data) [hereinafter STATISTICAL BRIEFING
BOOK].
222
See Primus, supra note 17, at 693 (noting average length of appeal and
comparing it to length of appellate process).
223
See STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 221.
224
See Judith B. Jones, Access to Counsel, JUV. JUST. BULL. (Office of Justice
Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Wash., D.C.), June 2004, at 5–6,
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/204063.pdf. (noting the dilemma facing
juvenile defenders seeking to file appeals when clients have relatively short sentences,
yet the appellate process is long and the juvenile court unlikely to stay a disposition
pending appeal).
225
See Arkin, supra note 167, at 513–14.
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226

right. The right is nearly meaningless if they are not told about it and
not provided an attorney to pursue it. A fourteen-year-old cannot be
expected to know that she can ask a reviewing court to consider errors at
trial or in her plea, and she certainly cannot navigate the complex rules
227
of appellate procedure on her own. Therefore, court rules must be
enacted that require judges to inform juveniles of their right to appeal
upon resolution of their cases. Additionally, juveniles should be entitled
to expedite appeals, given that the length of time it typically takes to
prosecute an appeal exceeds the average juvenile sentence. Jurisdictions
should abandon or modify the in-custody requirement for state post228
conviction claims for the same reason.

226
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-202(f)(1)(c)(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009)
(requiring the child’s attorney to advise him or her in language they can understand
on whether to appeal a court decision); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-325(B) (2007)
(“Immediately after an order of disposition the juvenile hearing officer shall advise
the juvenile that a right to appeal exists, the applicable time limit and the location
and manner of filing the notice of appeal.”); CAL. R. CT. 5.590 (2009) (“In juvenile
court proceedings in which the child is found to be a person described by section
300, 601, or 602 after a contested issue of fact or law, the juvenile court, after making
its order at the conclusion of the dispositional hearing or an order changing or
modifying a previous disposition at the conclusion of a hearing on a supplemental
petition, will advise, either orally or in writing, the child and, if present, the child’s
parent, guardian, or adult relative of any right to appeal from such order, of the
necessary steps and time for taking an appeal, and of the right of an indigent person
to have counsel appointed by the reviewing court.”); ILL. CT. R. & P. 605(a)–(b)
(2009) (Defendant in a juvenile court proceeding to be notified of right to appeal
after entering a plea); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-557(1) (West 2008) (“At the
beginning of each adjudicatory hearing, the youth court shall . . . explain to the
parties . . . the right to appeal.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-279.01(1)(g) (2008) (“[T]he
court shall inform the parties of the . . . [r]ight to appeal and have a transcript or
record of the proceedings for such purpose.”); OHIO R. JUV. P. 34(J) (2008) (“At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court shall advise the child of the child’s right to
record expungement and, where any part of the proceeding was contested, advise the
parties of their right to appeal.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-30 (2004) (“The court
shall advise the child and the child’s parents, guardian or custodian . . . [of] the right
to appeal according to the rules of appellate procedure governing civil actions.”);
TENN. R. JUV. P. 36(c) (2009) (“At the dispositional hearing on a petition alleging
delinquent or unruly conduct, whether before the referee or judge and whether on a
plea of guilty or not guilty, if the respondent is found guilty, he or she shall be
informed of the right to appeal, the time limit for appeal, the manner in which to
perfect an appeal, and the right to an appointed attorney on appeal if indigent.”);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 56.01(e) (Vernon 2008) (“On entering an order that is
appealable under this section, the court shall advise the child and the child’s parent,
guardian, or guardian ad litem of the child’s rights [to appeal] listed under
Subsection (d) of this section.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-1109(3) (2008) (“If the
parties are present in the courtroom, the court shall inform them of . . . their right to
appeal within the specified time limits . . . .”).
227
Marrus, supra note 125, at 302.
228
I also endorse proposals offered by would-be IAC reformers in the adult
context, such as providing counsel for federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Emily
Garcia Uhrig, A Case for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Habeas Corpus, 60 HASTINGS
L.J. 541, 544 (2009). In addition, I support proposals allowing appellate attorneys to
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Even if such reforms were implemented, the Strickland v. Washington
229
standard would continue to present a formidable obstacle. Yet the case
may not forever be the obstacle it is now.
230
231
In a trio of capital cases—Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, and
232
Rompilla v. Beard —the Court reversed death sentences after it found
trial counsel ineffective for failing to conduct adequate investigation to
prepare for the sentencing phase. Commentators agree that the amount
and quality of investigative work in these cases was actually better than
233
that performed by the trial attorney for David Strickland. The Court
nevertheless held it ineffective in all three cases, distinguishing without
234
overruling Strickland.

supplement the trial record in order to bring an IAC claim on direct appeal. See
Primus, supra note 17, at 682.
229
466 U.S. 668, 678 (1984).
230
529 U.S. 362, 395–96 (2000) (“[C]ounsel did not begin to prepare for [the
sentencing] phase . . . until a week before the trial . . . failed to conduct an
investigation that would have uncovered extensive records graphically describing
Williams’ nightmarish childhood, . . . failed to introduce available evidence that
Williams was ‘borderline mentally retarded’ and did not advance beyond sixth grade
in school . . . [and] failed to seek prison records recording Williams’ commendations
for [good conduct while in prison]. . . . [T]rial counsel did not fulfill their obligation
to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.”).
231
539 U.S. 510, 528, 534 (2003) (trial lawyers’ limited investigation of mitigating
evidence violates petitioner’s right to effective assistance of counsel at the capital
sentencing phase notwithstanding counsel’s claim of “strategic decision” to curtail
investigation and concentrate on other types of appeals to sentencing jury, when
attorneys’ “decision to end their investigation when they did was neither consistent
with the professional standards that prevailed . . . [at the time of sentencing], nor
reasonable in light of the evidence counsel uncovered in the social services records—
evidence that would have led a reasonably competent attorney to investigate
further”).
232
545 U.S. 374, 377, 383, 385–86, 390 (2005) (trial attorney was “deficient in
failing to examine the court file on Rompilla’s prior conviction,” given that the
“prosecution was going to use the dramatic facts of a similar prior offense, and
[accordingly] Rompilla’s counsel had a duty to make all reasonable efforts to learn
what they could about the offense . . . [which] certainly included obtaining the
Commonwealth’s own readily available file on the prior conviction to learn what the
Commonwealth knew about the crime, to discover any mitigating evidence the
Commonwealth would downplay, and to anticipate the details of the aggravating
evidence the Commonwealth would emphasize,” and that all of this was true even
when, as in this case, the “capital defendant’s family members and the defendant
himself have suggested that no mitigating evidence is available, his lawyer is bound to
make reasonable efforts to obtain and review material that counsel knows the
prosecution will probably rely on as evidence of aggravation at the sentencing phase
of trial” and that trial counsel’s omission was prejudicial in that review of file would
have revealed a “range of mitigation leads that no other source had opened up.”).
233
See, e.g., Gregory J. O’Meara, The Name is the Same but the Facts Have Been
Changed to Protect the Attorneys: Strickland, Judicial Discretion, and Appellate DecisionMaking, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 687, 687 (2008) (“[C]ounsel in both Wiggins and Rompilla
did far more than trial counsel in Strickland v. Washington, where the Court found
counsel’s representation to be effective under the Constitution.”).
234
Blume & Neumann, supra note 188, at 129.
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In each of the cases, the Court elevated in importance the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice as a benchmark for assessing whether trial
counsel’s failure to conduct a comprehensive sentencing investigation
235
was reasonable. In Strickland, Justice O’Connor had rejected the notion
that trial counsel’s performance should be measured against ABA
standards, admonishing that they were simply to function as guides to
236
determine reasonableness. In Wiggins, by contrast, Justice O’Connor
referred to ABA standards as “well-defined norms;” trial counsel’s
departure from the standards by failing to investigate constituted
237
ineffective assistance. While the doctrinal shift signified by the WilliamsWiggins-Rompilla trilogy has done nothing to alter the problematic
238
“prejudice” prong of Strickland, it does appear to have given the
attorney-performance prong teeth, at least in the sentencing phases of
239
capital cases. The fact that Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla all employ
the ABA Standards as the benchmark against which to measure
objectively reasonable representation bolsters the argument that juvenile
trial-level lawyering must comport with accepted professional standards
240
to be considered effective.
235

Id.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
237
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003). In Bobby v. Van Hook, the U.S.
Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had improperly relied on ABA
Guidelines in finding the representation of an attorney in the sentencing phase of a
capital case ineffective. Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13 (2009) (per curiam) (citing
ABA, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/
downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/deathpenaltyguidelines2003.pdf). However, this
case does not overrule Wiggins.
238
Adam M. Gershowitz, Get In the Game or Get Out of the Way: Fixing the Politics of
Death, 94 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 51, 53 (2008), http://www.virginialawreview.org/
inbrief/2008/09/29/gershowitz.pdf (arguing that Williams-Wiggins-Rompilla trilogy, in
failing to alter prejudice requirement, does little to ensure effective assistance of
counsel).
239
Scholars are divided over whether these cases will have any impact outside the
capital context. See, e.g., Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death,
94 VA. L. REV. 283, 355 (2008); Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1097, 1117–20 (2004) (arguing that results in these cases reflect an
evolution in the Court’s view of the centrality of investigation in defense lawyering
brought about by high-profile exonerations of death-row prisoners whose attorneys
had conducted no or minimal investigation). But see Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective
Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1069, 1111 (2009) (arguing that these cases can
and should apply in non-capital sentencing).
240
Ellen Marrus argues that the first prong of Strickland makes IAC claims in
juvenile delinquency cases nearly impossible to make. She suggests that because the
overall level of performance in juvenile court is low, and is in many instances
dominated by attorneys practicing “best-interests” lawyering, in which they substitute
their own judgment for that of their own clients, that reviewing courts would find that
sub-par representation is actually consistent with professional norms. Marrus, supra
note 9, at 417–20. However, Wiggins, decided after Marrus’s article, appears to suggest
that the first prong of Strickland can be decided against professional standards, rather
236
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While Strickland, particularly as it has been modified by Williams,
Wiggins, and Rompilla, need not be a barrier to the filing of IAC claims, it
is worth noting in closing that it is not clear that Strickland need be the
standard that is applied to juvenile ineffective assistance of counsel claims
in any event. As noted above, the juvenile right to counsel is premised on
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, while the adult
right to counsel is premised on the Sixth Amendment. The due process
grounding of the juvenile right to counsel—along with the different,
more rehabilitative purpose of juvenile court—creates an opening for an
appellate attorney to argue that the two-prong test of Strickland is not the
241
appropriate standard for measuring juvenile IAC claims.
Commentators have proposed many alternatives to the Strickland test
242
in the adult context. A variation on one such alternative that would be
appropriate in the juvenile context is one proposed by Judge David
243
Bazelon in United States v. DeCoster. In that case, decided eleven years
before Strickland, Judge Bazelon essentially adopted the ABA Standards as
a constitutional benchmark for evaluating the provision of effective
assistance. He proposed that if a defendant could establish a violation of
those standards by trial counsel, the burden would shift to the
244
government to establish lack of prejudice on the eventual outcome. A
juvenile-appropriate alternative to Strickland would, like Judge Bazelon’s
test in DeCoster, eliminate or modify Strickland’s prejudice requirement.
The reason for the change would be different from the reasons
motivating proposals in the adult context, which focus on the “hindsight
bias” of reviewing courts that make convictions appear inevitable that in
245
fact might have been avoided with competent trial counsel, or the fact
that the prejudice requirement functions as a demand that the
defendant/appellant essentially demonstrate that he is factually
246
innocent.
A juvenile-appropriate IAC standard would eliminate or modify the
prejudice requirement because the goals of juvenile court—as
recognized by Gault and again in every subsequent Supreme Court case
addressing the requirements of due process in delinquency
than simply against the lowest common denominator of attorney performance. See
Wiggins, 539 U.S. 510.
241
See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (noting that due
process is “a concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other specific
and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights”); Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union,
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (establishing fluidity of due process).
242
See, e.g., William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and
Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 168–70
(1995) (summarizing alternatives to Strickland).
243
DeCoster I, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
244
Id. at 1203–04. The District of Columbia Circuit Court, sitting en banc,
rejected Bazelon’s proposal in a lengthy opinion. United States v. DeCoster (DeCoster
II), 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
245
Bibas, supra note 193, at 2.
246
Merton, supra note 196, at 1025.
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247

proceedings—include rehabilitation, and, again as recognized in Gault,
a child’s ability to invest in his rehabilitation is premised on his
perception that he was treated fairly. That is, the process of the
delinquency proceeding may be as significant for a juvenile’s
rehabilitation as its outcome. Thus, whether or not the deficient
representation affected the fact-finder’s decision that the juvenile was
delinquent is not the only, or even necessarily the most significant,
inquiry that a reviewing court should undertake in evaluating whether
248
the representation was ineffective. Even if the deficient representation
did not affect the factual finding of guilt or innocence, if it thwarted the
juvenile’s rehabilitation, it may nevertheless have been constitutionally
ineffective—or so one could argue in appropriate cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Child advocates and scholars have long documented the need for
more zealous representation of juveniles. They have called for increased
salaries, lower caseloads, increased training for attorneys, an end to the
practice of assigning the most inexperienced practitioners to juvenile
court, and judicial training on the importance of expressed-interest
249
lawyering. Comparatively less attention has been paid to the need for
increased access to appellate advocacy, particularly to the juvenile’s
ability to file IAC claims, as a means of ensuring system-wide reform. Yet
IAC claims do have a role to play in this regard.
IAC claims also can have some impact, however limited, on the
250
system-wide problem of deficient representation in four principal ways:
247

Today, a few state purpose clauses focus primarily on child welfare goals, while
other states weigh public safety, punishment, and deterrence goals. Most states,
however, adopt a balanced approach that addresses public safety but also addresses a
youth’s rehabilitation. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 5, at 97.
248
The Due Process undergirding of the juvenile right to counsel could facilitate
such an argument. As Professor Tracey Meares has argued, early criminal procedure
cases decided under the Due Process Clause emphasized the importance of public
perceptions of fairness in the criminal justice system. See Tracey L. Meares, Everything
Old Is New Again: Fundamental Fairness and the Legitimacy of Criminal Justice, 3 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 105, 111–14 (2005). In such cases, defendants were entitled to reversals of
their convictions where “fundamental principles of justice and liberty” were
ignored—in spite of evidence (sometimes strong) of guilt. Id. at 111. While the Due
Process Clause has almost completely given way to the specific guarantees of the Bill
of Rights in the adult criminal context in assessments of whether prosecutions are
constitutional or not, it continues to govern appellate analysis of juvenile
proceedings. As such, what Professor Meares describes as the “public-regarding”
elements of due process could lead to a different view of whether an attorney in a
delinquency case performed effectively than the Strickland analysis, through which a
lack of demonstrated prejudice to the juvenile can doom an IAC claim. Id. at 106,
111–14.
249
See, e.g., ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & MID-ATL. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., supra
note 111.
250
Thanks to Randy Hertz for helping me develop this insight on the systemic
role that IAC litigation can play.
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(1) establishing a standard of professional conduct, albeit a floor of what
is constitutionally permissible conduct rather than a ceiling of zealous
advocacy; (2) deterring actionable misconduct through the setting of
251
these norms; (3) performing a signaling function for attorneys that
delinquency practice is a serious one; and (4) identifying those lawyers
who have practiced ineffectively and who should therefore be considered
252
for removal from the panel of court-appointed lawyers.
For those reasons, everyone who cares about Gault’s promise that
children, through legal representation, must be treated fairly and with
dignity, should also be concerned with the inadequacy of IAC claims to
ensure that attorneys achieve those results for their clients.

251

See generally Lissa Lamkin Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Signaling Through
Board Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 447 (2009) (describing
signaling theory and applying it to broad diversity in corporation).
252
An argument can be made that even if IAC claims were filed on behalf of
aggrieved juveniles at a rate commensurate with ineffective assistance, it would be at
best a weak form of redress for the individual who was harmed. Appeals take years to
wind through the courts, and by the time an IAC claim is heard, the impact of the
harm—a probation period or even an incarcerating sentence, for example—has
dissipated. And even when a juvenile “wins” on the basis of IAC, the remedy is at best
either a retrial or resentencing. See James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2120–21 (2000) (discussing the inadequacy of appellate
procedure in relation to death penalty cases).

